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Thesis Abstract
In this thesis, I investigate the nature of metaphysics and the role it plays in our broader
theoretical pursuits. In doing so, I defend it against various criticisms and offer a novel
conception of why metaphysical disputes are important.
In Chapter One I address the general question of when disputes are defective and when
they are worth taking seriously. I first criticize one popular way of answering this
question that appeals to the difference between verbal and factual disputes. Verbal
disputes involve divergence in what the participants mean by their terms and some think
that metaphysical disputes are defective in this way. I argue that this approach fails
because the verbal/factual distinction is incapable of doing the work this view requires of
it. I then offer an alternative view where the status of a dispute depends on its role in our
theorizing. Worthwhile (or, as I call them, significant) disputes are those with
appropriate connections to the rest of our theorizing while defective (or insignificant)
disputes are insular, with no implications for anything beyond themselves.
In Chapter Two I apply the framework developed in the previous chapter to a pair of
ontological disagreements: those over the existence of concrete possible worlds and
coincident material objects, like a statue and its clay. The question is whether ontological
disputes like these have the requisite theoretical connections to render them significant. I
argue that they do. I then address some general reasons for doubting their significance,
arguing that they are not compelling.
In Chapter Three I contrast my approach with some other recent defenses of metaphysics,
with particular focus on the views developed by Theodore Sider. Metaphysics is, on
these views, an inquiry into the world's fundamental structure. I argue that this approach
is unsatisfactory because it cannot guarantee that metaphysical disputes are significant in
the way I describe. It thus threatens to render metaphysics irrelevant to our other
theoretical activities, undermining many of its legitimate successes, like the role
theorizing about metaphysical modality played in the development of modal logics
applicable in many different fields.
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Chapter 1
When is a Dispute Worth Taking Seriously?
Disputes are common throughout philosophy and elsewhere. In some cases,
people suspect that a dispute is somehow defective or confused. A common sort of
confusion according to ordinary diagnoses is that the disputants are merely talking past
one another, or arguing over words without realizing it. If they understood one another
properly, they would no longer disagree. The dispute is merely verbal. Philosophers in
particular are often accused of talking past one another. Though they take their
disagreements seriously, many can appear to be based on nothing more than differences
in how they use the terms in question. Some think that by clearly defining our terms, we
can strip away these distracting terminological disagreements and move beyond them to
the bedrock of genuine factual disagreements they mask. Hence many philosophers see
the idea of merely verbal disputes as a powerful philosophical tool, one that can be used
to dissolve many of the more intractable philosophical disputes.
In this chapter, I will show that these hopes are misguided. Though we may be
able to recognize verbal disputes in straightforward cases, as happens in some ordinary
contexts, the distinction between verbal and factual disputes is not robust enough to be
usefully employed in philosophy. Serious difficulties arise when attempting to apply the
distinction in philosophy and they can be avoided only by appealing to implausible
conceptions of meaning. Hence it cannot be relied upon to do explanatory or
methodological work, by either accounting for the defectiveness of certain disputes or
helping us determine which disputes to take seriously and which to ignore.
On my view, the status of the verbal/factual disputes distinction is the same as the
status of the analytic/synthetic distinction-the distinction between truths of fact and
truths of meaning-according to the widely held view that we can recognize analytic
truths in certain straightforward cases, but the distinction is too problematic to do any
serious work in philosophy. The close connection between the two distinctions should
not be surprising: many advocates of the philosophical significance of the verbal/factual
distinction are also defenders of the analytic/synthetic distinction. For instance, David
Chalmers introduces his discussion of the verbal/factual distinction with the question "Is
there a distinction between questions of fact and questions of language?" and goes on to
say that despite a tendency among some philosophers to answer no, a "version of this
distinction is ubiquitous in philosophy and elsewhere in the notion of a verbal dispute."
(Chalmers (forthcoming))
Thus one might see verbality as a Trojan horse of sorts for analyticity, helping to
revive the distinction between questions of fact and questions of language and gaining
additional authority through its applications outside of philosophy. In section 1.2, I will
argue that rather than making analyticity more respectable, the connection between the
two notions makes verbality more suspect. That is so regardless of the use made of the
verbal/factual disputes distinction outside of philosophy, since the unsystematic and
highly defeasible application of the distinction in response to specific examples in
ordinary contexts differs greatly from the kind of work philosophers hope to do with it.
My ultimate hope is that just as a proper understanding of the limitations of the
analytic/synthetic distinction helped make room for a more sympathetic understanding of
the subject matter of certain areas of philosophy (such as metaphysics), a proper
understanding of the limitations of the verbal/factual disputes distinction will help make
room for a more sympathetic understanding of the nature of philosophical disputes.
Seeing that the verbal/factual disputes distinction cannot play the kind of role that
many philosophers think it can leaves us with various questions concerning the
distinction between disputes that are in good standing and those that are somehow
defective. In section 1.3, I will offer an alternative proposal for how to explain this
distinction and how, in practice, to distinguish between cases of either kind. The
proposal is that whether a dispute is worthwhile (or significant, in my terms), depends on
the dispute's theoretical role, which is to be understood in terms of the impact the dispute
has on our theorizing in general and vice versa. Significant disputes have some relevance
to our broader theoretical interests, while insignificant disputes are insular, having no
impact on anything outside the disputes themselves. With this account, we can explain
what it is for disputes to be defective or not. It also clarifies the practical issue of how to
tell whether a dispute is significant: let the dispute play out and see whether it connects
up with the rest of our theorizing in interesting ways. Engaging in the dispute itself, or
carefully considering its details, is how to determine whether it's worth taking seriously,
since that is how to determine whether it is a theoretical dead end.
1.1 Verbal Disputes
I'll begin by clarifying what it is for a dispute to be verbal. The idea that the
distinction between verbal and factual disputes plays an important philosophical role goes
back at least to Hume:
From this circumstance alone, that a controversy has been long kept on foot, and
remains still undecided, we may presume, that there is some ambiguity in the
expression, and that the disputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in
the controversy. (1748/1993, p. 53)
Hume's discussion captures the underlying idea of what makes a dispute verbal: if a
dispute is merely verbal, then the disputants mean something different by some term in
the disputed sentences without realizing it. That condition seems to account for both the
apparent defectiveness of verbal disputes along with the fact that the defectiveness is
somehow a matter of language. This idea is spelled out more carefully by Chalmers:
A dispute over sentence S is merely verbal iff for some term T in S, the
participants use T differently (or disagree, perhaps tacitly, about the meaning of
T) and the dispute over S arises wholly in virtue of this difference regarding T.
Although there may be problems with taking this condition as sufficient for verbality, it is
plausible that it is necessary.' Various other philosophers who have recently discussed
verbal disputes (such as by Eli Hirsch (2005, 2009) and David Manley (2009)) are also
committed to this necessary condition, either explicitly or because their characterizations
entail it.
'The problem with taking it as sufficient is that it will probably overgenerate, especially in cases where the
dispute about S hangs on the meaning of context sensitive terms, like demonstratives. We might, for
instance, have a dispute about whether something is a rock that will involve a disagreement over the
sentence "This is a rock," and in doing so disagree about whether "this" stands for a rock in the context, but
our dispute should not be considered merely verbal on that basis.
In the next section, I will argue that this necessary condition gives rise to serious
problems that prevent the notion of verbal disputes from playing an important role in
philosophy.
1.2 The Problem with Verbal Disputes
I will begin by briefly presenting the problem, after which I will elaborate on it
and explain what I think it shows. It will be helpful to begin with a comparison to an
older dialectic concerning the analytic/synthetic distinction (ASD): the distinction
between sentences true purely in virtue of their meaning, and those true partly in virtue of
meaning and partly in virtue of the way the world is. For example, "All bachelors are
unmarried," is often regarded as a paradigmatic analytic sentence, while "All bachelors
eat pancakes," would count as synthetic. Consider an influential objection to the ASD
(offered in some form by W. V. 0. Quine (1951, 1976a), Keith Donnellan (1962), Hilary
Putnam (1962, 1975), Jerry Fodor (1964), Edward Shirley (1973), and others).
Sometimes we change our attitude toward a sentence: at one time we accept it and then
later we reject it. If the sentence in question is analytic (before the change), then we must
regard the change in attitude as due to a change in the meaning of the sentence: if the
sentence is true in virtue of meaning, then we can come to regard it as false only if we no
longer take it to have the same meaning. 2 On the other hand, if the sentence is synthetic,
then such a change could reflect either a change in meaning or a change in our beliefs
about the subject matter.
The problem, so the objection goes, is that there is an inescapable element of
arbitrariness in whether some change in attitude should be regarded as reflecting a change
in meaning or a change in belief. That is because in most cases we could interpret it
either way: generally when we change our attitude toward a sentence, that change could
be accounted for by appealing to changes in our beliefs, without appealing to changes in
meaning. Furthermore, in most cases the reasons we have for changing our attitude in the
first place do not provide principled reasons for preferring one interpretation over the
2 There may also be cases where we have false beliefs about the sentence's meaning, in which case we can
change our attitude without changing the meaning even if the sentence is analytic. For our purposes, we
can stipulate that we're not talking about cases like this, which is fair so long as the defender of analyticity
doesn't embrace a kind of global skepticism concerning our knowledge of meaning.
other. So it's often unsettled whether a change in attitude reflects a change in meaning
rather than a change in belief.
Examples can be found throughout the history of science. It's plausible that at
some time "Water is an element" was regarded as analytic, but due to the development of
modem chemistry, that sentence is now regarded as false. However, there seems to be no
principled reason to think that such a change reflects a difference in the meaning of
"water" or "element," especially since the reasons for the change were the discovery that
water consists of complex molecules-an object-level, empirical fact of the sort that is
generally a reason to change our beliefs about water, rather than the meaning of "water."
That's not to say that we couldn't explain this change in terms of a change in meaning,
but it shows that there is nothing about the case in question that forces us to do so. Other
examples include sentences like "Atoms are indivisible," "I can hear you only if you are
within earshot," "Whales are fish," and "One cannot reach the place from which one
came by traveling away from it in a straight line and continuing to move in a constant
sense." 3 All of these may have been regarded as analytic at some point and all of them
are now regarded as false. According to defenders of the ASD, the meanings of these
sentences must have changed, but in none of these cases are there principled reasons for
thinking that there was a change in meaning rather than a change in belief.
The verbal/factual disputes distinction (VFD) is open to a similar objection.
According to those who accept the VFD, we can distinguish between disputes that arise
from differences in what the disputants mean by their terms and disputes that arise from a
difference in their factual beliefs. Notice, however, that this distinction is simply a
synchronic, interpersonal version of the diachronic, intrapersonal distinction between
changes in meaning and changes in belief. In the case of analyticity, we considered a
single person changing her attitudes towards a sentence over time. In the case of
verbality, we have two people with conflicting attitudes towards a sentence at the same
time, and the distinction that the defender of verbality wants to draw is essentially the
same as the one we criticized above, transposed into this new setting.
3 Some of these examples are discussed in various places in the literature, especially "Whales are fish." An
early example is Donnellan (1962). The last example comes from Putnam (1962).
Hence the same objection applies. These disputes can generally be construed as
resting on underlying disagreements about the facts, rather than divergences in meaning,
and the reasons for thinking that the speakers are disagreeing can be equally well
understood as reasons for thinking that the participants hold different beliefs. Generally
there is no independent reason to think that they mean something different rather than just
hold different beliefs.
For instance, a case where two people agree about someone's height in inches but
disagree about whether she is tall might be thought to be a paradigmatic verbal dispute,
but even it can be construed as factual. Perhaps both participants have a property in
mind, tallness, and disagree about its extension. The reasons they offer in defense of
their position will be of the form "So-and-so is definitely tall, and he is shorter than her;"
namely, factual claims about the extension of tallness (not sociolinguistic claims about
the use of "tall")-precisely the kinds of things our beliefs about a property's extension
should be sensitive to. Why not, then, regard it as a factual disagreement about the
extension of a property?4
A philosophical example with a similar upshot can be found in certain
disagreements over personal identity. In some disputes over whether, for instance, a
certain entity is a person, or whether two temporally distinct person-like entities are
stages of the same person, the participants agree about many of the underlying physical
(and perhaps metaphysical) facts, like when and where the entities exist, what they are
composed of, their causal history, and so on. Nonetheless, the disputants still disagree
concerning whether they are persons, or the same person. In such a case, their agreement
on the underlying facts generates some temptation to construe the dispute as merely
verbal, resting on a difference in the disputants' usage of "person." 5 However, there is
another way of construing the dispute, according to which they both have some property,
personhood, in mind, and they disagree about whether certain entities instantiate that
property. Clearly they disagree about its extension and perhaps the conditions necessary
for possessing the property, but that needn't prevent them from having the same property
4 This example might be slightly confusing, since even if one thinks that "tall" picks out a property, one
will still think it picks out different properties in different contexts. The relevant kind of disagreement for
the example is one that takes place in a single context, the point being that there we're not forced to
interpret the disputants as meaning different things. Thanks to Steve Yablo for the example.
5 Derek Parfit defended this line at one point (see Parfit (1995)).
in mind and then having a factual disagreement about it (otherwise, factual disagreement
will be much less common than we ordinarily suppose).6
What do these considerations show? There are various different conclusions one
might draw that are not always clearly distinguished in discussions of the ASD (perhaps
for good reason, since it's not totally clear what follows from the problem I've
described). It is worthwhile, however, to get a sense for the different conclusions that
might follow, so I will consider some of the options. I'll begin by mentioning two
possible views just to set them aside, before discussing some others that are more
plausible. The first is that there simply is no ASD and no VFD, perhaps because the
distinctions are unintelligible. I don't think we should accept this conclusion because it's
too strong. As Grice and Strawson (1956) point out, "the existence of statements.. .about
which it is pointless to press the question whether they are analytic or synthetic does not
entail the nonexistence of statements which are clearly classifiable in one or other of
these ways," and there is still non-collusive agreement about whether certain sentences
are analytic, and certain disputes verbal, in some straightforward cases. An example of a
clearly verbal dispute is William James' case of a person walking around a tree while a
squirrel crawls around the trunk of the tree in order to remain unseen by the person.7 The
tree always remains between the person and the squirrel. A dispute over whether the
person is going around the squirrel could easily be based on confusion over two different
senses of "around"-the person does go around in the sense that her path encloses the
squirrel, but the person does not go around in the sense that she never moves behind the
squirrel. Rather than reject the VFD entirely, we can allow that there are some clear
cases, while nonetheless holding that in most cases the distinction plays no important
role. In light of this, I think we should accept a view along the lines of that defended by
Hilary Putnam (1975). There may well be an ASD and a VFD, but they are unable to do
certain kinds of philosophical work that their proponents hoped they could do (I will
elaborate on this in a moment).
6 The problem I'm pointing to here may remind some readers of one noted by Tim Sundell (MS), but it is
importantly different. Sundell points out that sometimes there are also facts at stake in what are clearly
verbal disagreements, while I want to point out that there are difficulties in understanding disagreements as
verbal in the first place.
7 James (1907/1981).
The second view I want to set aside is that there really is an ASD and a VFD, but
they can only be drawn on the basis of empirical evidence from linguistics, psychology,
and other sciences. On this view it is objectively settled, for each sentence, whether that
sentence is analytic or synthetic (for instance), but whether it is so can only be known on
the basis of empirical inquiry. Such a view would support a Putnam-style conclusion:
there is a distinction, but it lacks certain features traditionally associated with the ASD
and is thus unable to do certain kinds of work its proponents wanted it to do. For
example, on this view whether some sentence is analytic is not reflectively accessible to
speakers just in virtue of their linguistic competence. Hence this ASD would be
unsuitable as an explanation of the possibility of a priori knowledge.8 Though similar to
the sort of view I want to defend, I don't think this view is correct. I think the problem
with the distinctions in question goes deeper.
There remain three possibilities to consider, each of which is fairly plausible (I
remain neutral on which is correct, though I find the first the least plausible and the last
the most plausible). The first is that although there is an ASD and a VFD, as a matter of
fact there are no, or almost no, analytic sentences or verbal disputes. The distinctions are
intelligible in principle, but don't mark any real distinction between actual cases,
because, as a matter of fact, sentences are (almost) always synthetic and disputes (almost)
always factual. In this case, I will call the distinctions empty, like the distinction between
flying horses and non-flying horses. A second possibility is that the distinctions are
vague. Although we can make sense of them, and although they have instances on both
sides, there is a large set of cases where it is indefinite how they apply. Thus although
there might be some disputes that are clearly verbal, there will be many borderline cases
where the dispute is not clearly verbal or factual. In that case, the distinctions are like
that between red and orange. A third possibility is that the distinctions are arbitrary, by
which I mean that (focusing on VFD), outside of some clear cases at the extremes,
disputes can be understood as either factual or verbal and it is objectively unsettled which
construal is correct. In other words, they can be equally well construed as factual or
8 The thought here is that, on traditional views, analyticity explains the possibility of a priori knowledge
because we can know whether certain sentences are true (the analytic ones) just on the basis of our
linguistic competence rather than on the basis of experience (even if we need experience to acquire that
competence in the first place). However, if linguistic competence alone isn't enough to know whether an
analytic sentence is true, as on the present supposition, then it's not clear how the explanation works.
verbal.9 An example of this sort of arbitrariness is whether a sentence like "The referent
of 'Halifax' is among the set of things picked out by the predicate 'is a city"' is, perhaps
implicitly, about language or about the world. Given the equivalence between that
sentence and "Halifax is a city," both characterizations are defensible and neither is
solely correct.' 0' 1
These three views all lead to the conclusion that there is a distinction, but it can't
do what philosophers hoped it could. So, we need to ask: exactly what work are these
distinctions unable to do? Set aside the ASD and focus on the VFD. There are at least
two philosophical applications of the VFD that are undermined by the objection. The
first is methodological: we might want a practical guide to which disputes are worth
taking seriously, one that will inform our decisions about which disputes to engage in.
The VFD is sometimes held to provide a methodological tool that can help us make those
decisions. The second is explanatory: we might want a constitutive account of what
9 Arbitrariness and vagueness are similar in that they both entail that in many cases, it is objectively
unsettled whether the dispute in question is verbal or factual. They differ in that if the distinction is vague,
it is objectively unsettled because neither property clearly applies. If the distinction is arbitrary, it is
objectively unsettled because either could be consistently applied and neither is better supported by the
facts. We might also characterize this as a situation where the dispute is both verbal and factual, though
perhaps in different, equally good senses; the important point in that case is that they aren't merely verbal.
10 Williamson (2007, p. 26-8) makes a similar point, arguing that even if there is a sense in which object-
level sentences are implicitly about language in virtue of equivalences with metalinguistic sentences, it
follows that there is also a sense in which those metalinguistic sentences are implicitly not about language
in virtue of the very same equivalences.
" One might want an explanation of how the VFD could be arbitrary in this way. I am not entirely
confident what the explanation would be, but I can sketch one possibility in order to indicate the sort of
thing I have in mind. One mechanism that could generate this kind of arbitrariness is conflict in the
principles that guide our interpretation (or, in less committal terms, among the facts that determine
meaning). One guiding principle is that we should, as best we can, interpret speakers so that they mean the
same by the same or similar utterances; or, in other words, that we should prefer interpretations that
minimize differences in meaning between speakers. Such a principle is plausible since something along
those lines is needed to preserve communication. Too frequent attributions of differences in meaning
would undermine our ability to communicate successfully, since it would mean we are, in general, talking
past one another. This principle would generate a presumption in favor of interpreting disputes as factual,
based on differences in belief rather than meaning. Another principle, however, generates the opposite
presumption: the principle that we should minimize seemingly trivial or intractable or vacuous (or, perhaps
more generally, inexplicable) disagreement between speakers. This can be seen as an offshoot of the
principle of charity. We expect speakers to be reasonable, and so we should do our best to avoid
interpreting them in such a way that they engage in unreasonable disagreements. This principle generates a
presumption in favor of interpreting certain kinds of disputes as merely verbal. It's obvious that in many
cases these principles will pull in opposite directions, but it's also obvious that in many cases both will be
applicable given the facts at hand. There will be some exceptions, as when the dispute is so obviously
trivial that the second principle wins out (perhaps evidenced by the participants' willingness to abandon the
dispute after being made aware of the possibility that it is verbal). But in many cases, both interpretations
will be defensible on the basis of these principles and it will be objectively unsettled which of these
principles wins out, leaving it undetermined whether the dispute in question is verbal or not.
makes disputes worthwhile or defective. The VFD is sometimes held to provide such an
account. I will discuss both of these in turn.
Methodological applications of a distinction impose epistemological requirements
on our ability to tell whether and how the distinction applies to the objects being sorted.
If we are to use the distinction between As and Bs to determine whether certain objects
are F or G, we must be better, or more reliable, at determining whether the objects in
question are A or B than we are at determining whether they are F or G. Otherwise, the
A/B distinction would hinder rather than help us, since we could simply check whether
the thing we're investigating is F or G directly. For instance, if we want to use the
distinction between brown and yellow bananas as a guide to which bananas we should
eat, we need to be better at determining whether bananas are brown or yellow than we are
at telling which bananas are worth eating and which are not, independently of their color.
Otherwise the distinction will not, in practice, help guide our decisions about which to
eat.
Returning to the case at hand, one upshot of the objection above is that we're not
very reliable at judging when a dispute is verbal or not, even when it's clear that
something isn't quite right with the dispute in question. How does the objection
undermine our reliability? The thought is that, in general, our beliefs about whether some
dispute is verbal or factual are based largely on how naturally we can characterize the
dispute in the formal or material mode, either mentioning or using the key terms of the
dispute. The prima facie plausible thought is that these characterizations correlate with
whether the dispute actually is verbal or factual, making us reliable judges, but that
thought is undermined by the objection we've discussed. Even if we are strongly
inclined to characterize some dispute in the formal mode, as with the tallness case or the
personal identity case, that does not rule out the opposite characterization and leaves open
the possibility that the dispute is factual. Hence we're not reliable judges of whether a
dispute is verbal or factual, so the VFD should not be relied on to do methodological
work.12
12 Even if one disagrees with this particular account of why we're unreliable, I think it's clear from the
examples alone that it's difficult, in practice, to tell whether some dispute is verbal, enough to undermine
the distinction's methodological utility.
For explanatory applications, the crucial point is that a distinction is only as
explanatory as the basis on which it is drawn, because the distinction will inherit the
features (including any imprecision, vagueness, or arbitrariness) of that basis. It's not
enough that the extension of the distinction is relatively clear or that there is widespread
agreement about certain cases. It must also be that the distinction is a suitable one for the
purposes at hand, or that it matches the relevant features of whatever it is meant to
explain. An example might make this clearer: suppose we want to explain why bees are
more attracted to some flowers than to others. The flowers can be roughly categorized
into red and orange, with a lot of borderline cases. If the bees' behavior exhibits a similar
kind of vagueness (i.e. most of the bees visit the clearly red flowers but some also visit
those closer to orange, with their numbers trailing off somewhere in the middle), then we
could explain the bees' preferences in terms of the distinction between red and orange
flowers. If, however, there is a sharp cut off between the flowers that the bees visit and
those they don't, one that isn't mirrored in the distinction between red and orange
flowers, then that distinction is not a suitable explanation. A more suitable explanation
will match the precision in the bees' behavior (it might still involve vague notions like
colors, including red and orange, but they will need to be supplemented or rendered more
precise in some way). Vagueness, however, is not the only feature that is relevant; there
are other ways that an explanans must match its explanandum. For instance, if a
distinction is arbitrary, in the sense of being objectively unsettled or left open by the
facts in a large number of cases, then it is unsuited as an explanation of a less arbitrary
difference between the relevant objects. So, by showing that the VFD is empty, vague, or
arbitrary, the objection shows that the VFD is unsuitable as an explanation for the
difference between defective disputes and worthwhile disputes. 13
To draw these points together, recall that the VFD is the distinction between
disputes that are due to the participants meaning different things by their terms and those
that are due to their believing different things about the facts. For the distinction to be
13 Another possibility is to admit that the difference to be explained is itself empty or arbitrary or vague, but
I think that comes to largely the same thing, since it then becomes much less clear what the philosophical
relevance of the distinction is. For instance, many want to appeal to this difference in defending the claim
that ontological disputes are problematic but those in physics or some other branch of science or
philosophy are not; if we're forced to view the difference as arbitrary, it's unclear that these fine
distinctions can be drawn or what would be gained thereby.
methodologically and explanatorily useful, we must be able to reliably track whether
disputes rest on a difference in meaning (compared to what we're using it as a guide for)
and it must be non-arbitrary whether disputes rest on a difference in meaning (compared
to what we're trying to explain). The objection shows that neither is the case.
I will close this section with an analogy that should help illustrate the overall
view. Psychologists have observed that there is widespread agreement in how people
apply the distinction between bright and dark to coughs and sneezes (when asked, people
generally classify coughs as dark and sneezes as bright).' 4 This widespread agreement
suggests that there is some bright/dark distinction that applies to coughs and sneezes, just
as agreement over (some) cases might support the claim that there is an ASD and a VFD
(as Grice and Strawson argue). However, the agreement does not show that the
bright/dark distinction can do certain kinds of work. In particular, the distinction would
not be a useful guide, in practice, to whether some event is a cough or a sneeze, at least
for most people, since most of us are much better at determining whether something is a
cough or a sneeze by other means. It would be difficult to first figure out whether
something is bright or dark (in the relevant sense), and then decide whether it is a cough
or a sneeze on that basis. Similarly, the distinction does not provide a good explanation
of what the difference between coughs and sneezes consists in, for even if it is a relevant
difference, it is not robust enough: even if there is agreement over how to apply the
distinction, there is still less agreement concerning that than there is concerning whether
the events in question are coughs or sneezes. The distinction might be useful for other
purposes (it might tell us something interesting about the psychological basis of
metaphor, for instance, or about our understanding and use of language more generally),
but not for these. 5 The same, I think, is true of the VFD: there may well be a distinction,
14 Lawrence Marks (1982). Ernst Gombrich (1960) discusses a similar example where the names "ping"
and "pong" are used to name cats and elephants.
" The phenomena I'm discussing here is very similar to what Wittgenstein calls "secondary sense." ((1960,
p. 135-141); see also Cora Diamond (1995, p. 225-241)). In this case, the application of "bright" to sneezes
would be part of the secondary sense of "bright." Other examples include "Tuesday is lean, while
Wednesday is fat," and the much more common "This music is sad." Secondary sense is similar to
metaphor in some ways, but differs in that the primary/secondary senses of a term do not stand in the same
explanatory relationships that the literal/metaphorical senses of a term do (on the assumption that the literal
aspects of a term's meaning often play a role in explaining its metaphorical uses). Nonetheless, as
Wittgenstein argues, understanding secondary sense is often just as crucial, as far as understanding a term
goes, as understanding the primary sense is, meaning that secondary sense is an important aspect of our use
and it may well be important for some purposes, but it cannot do the methodological or
explanatory work that philosophers have hoped it can do.
1.3 When is a dispute worth taking seriously?
Nonetheless, it often happens that a dispute strikes us as somehow trivial or
vacuous. If we can't rely on the verbal/factual disputes distinction to help us figure out
which disputes are defective, or to help explain what that defectiveness consists in, it
would be helpful if we had some other way of understanding what's going on in these
cases.
What we're looking for is a way to understand the distinction between what I will
call "significant" disputes and "insignificant" disputes, where significant disputes are
those that are worth taking seriously, or paying attention to, or investing time and effort
in, and insignificant disputes are those that are somehow defective in ways that make
them not worth taking seriously. The account we're looking for should play two roles.
First, it should explain (as far as it is possible to explain) the difference between disputes
of these kinds and what their (in)significance consists in. Second, it should provide some
guidance for distinguishing between disputes of these kinds. How much guidance can be
provided or reasonably expected is an issue I will return to later, but the hope is that we
can at least do better than the verbal/factual disputes distinction.
Though I won't attempt a definition of it, I'm using the term "significant" in a
somewhat technical sense. The rough idea is that significant disputes are those whose
resolution matters or is important. There are, however, different ways a dispute might
matter. A dispute over how many votes a candidate has received is significant for
primarily political reasons; it bears on who can legitimately govern. A dispute over
which route to the airport is the quickest is significant for primarily practical reasons; it
bears on how to avoid being late for one's flight. A dispute in geology over the age of
the Earth is significant for primarily theoretical reasons; it bears on which theories we
should accept in geology, physics, and biology. These different ways of being significant
may not always be cleanly separable, but the one I'm most interested in is best captured
of language. These observations support my claim that this usage of these terms marks a real distinction,
but that it needn't be capable of fulfilling certain explanatory or methodological roles.
by the last example. There is also a correlative sense of "insignificant," applicable to
those disputes that lack the relevant feature. Though most disputes over the age of the
Earth are significant in the relevant sense, a dispute over the age of the Earth down to the
billionth decimal place is most likely insignificant. It's also natural to speak of a
dispute's mattering or being important to or for somebody, or relative to certain interests,
and so there may be a corresponding sense of "significance." A dispute over the identity
of my great, great grandfather might be significant to me (if I have an interest in
genealogy), but not to many other people. I have in mind a more impersonal notion of
significance. In saying that a dispute over the age of the Earth is significant, we needn't
think that it is significant to or for so-and-so (i.e. for any specific person) or relative to
any particular set of interests (except, perhaps, very general interests, like figuring out
what is true). Hopefully this helps pick out the notion I have in mind; more clarification
will come in what follows.
I think the proper approach is to look at the (theoretical) roles played by the
disputes. My suggestion is that what matters for whether a dispute is significant is how it
hooks up with the rest of our theoretical projects. What matters is whether the dispute is
the product of tensions arising from previous theorizing and whether its resolution would
have consequences for other theoretical issues by, for instance, helping us answer other
questions, resolve other disputes, open new lines of inquiry, draw new distinctions, and
so on. Although I think this gives us a good guide to what to look for in classifying
disputes, this characterization is admittedly rough. I'm not sure, however, that we should
seek out a more precise statement of the view. Even a rough characterization can yield a
precise classification of a wide range of cases and I see no simple way to codify the great
variety and complexity of factors on which a dispute's significance might depend. The
situation might thus be the reverse of that with the VFD: though easy to state precisely,
the VFD was ultimately found not to pick out a clear difference between disputes.
That being said, let me note some consequences of the view that shed more light
on it and remove the temptation to look for a perfectly precise and systematic account.
The first is that a dispute's significance cannot always be determined a priori, because its
theoretical role cannot be known a priori, or prior to actually pursuing the dispute to its
natural terminus. I think that is the correct result. It would, on the contrary, be amazing
if one could distinguish the worthwhile disputes from the empty ones merely by
reflecting on them in the abstract. We certainly can't do this in other areas of inquiry,
like physics or math (we can't, for instance, pronounce that some research program is
fruitless before even considering what results it may have). Rather, we must see how the
disputes play out, how they affect other areas of inquiry, whether they produce fruitful
lines of research, and so on. The upshot is that one reason for looking for a precise and
systematic account of significance-the desire to determine a priori whether some
dispute is worth engaging in, before getting our hands dirty-is misguided.
A second feature of the view is that a dispute's status depends largely on its
extrinsic features. Whether a dispute is worth taking seriously does not depend merely
on the features of the dispute itself, such as what the sentences are that it targets, what
languages are used, and who the participants are. Rather, it depends on the wider
theoretical context: what prior research produced the question, what prior commitments
led the parties to disagree, what lines of research their positions might produce, how their
positions bear on commitments in other areas of inquiry, and so on. A dispute's
significance is a matter of how it relates to our inquiry more generally and not on what
the dispute itself, in isolation from the rest of our theorizing, is like.
A consequence of this observation is that any dispute, individuated by its intrinsic
features, could be significant (or fail to be), so long as it occurs against the proper
theoretical background. Some might find this implausible, but I think it is correct. It's
not difficult to imagine contexts where an important theoretical question hangs on even
the most silly-seeming issue. Imagine arguing about whether every true sentence can be
rewritten in subject-predicate form (e.g. "A is thus and so"). In most contexts, this
question doesn't matter and an effort to establish whether such equivalences held would
be a waste of time (imagine, for instance, someone insisting on making sure that an
article submitted to a physics journal could be completely rewritten in that form before
publishing it). Nonetheless there are contexts where it is very important: if we are
evaluating Leibniz's theory of truth (according to which "an affirmation is true if its
predicate is contained in its subject,"' 6), or his defense of nominalism,' 7 then this is
16 G. W. Leibniz, quoted in Benson Mates (1986, p. 84). There are various other formulations of this idea
by Leibniz, e.g.: "in every true affirmative proposition, necessary or contingent, universal or singular, the
precisely the question to ask. Another example: Ann and Bert disagree as to whether,
during the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, there was one
destructive event (involving both towers) or two destructive events (each involving a
single tower only). For many purposes, e.g. if we were deciding how to describe the
event in a history textbook, this is beyond pointless. Yet it might matter a great deal for
the purpose of settling an insurance claim, depending on how it is worded (there could,
for instance, be limits on how much is paid per destructive event.)
That significance is extrinsic defuses another reason for wanting a precise and
systematic account: the thought that we can settle, once and for all, which disputes are
significant and which aren't. If significance is extrinsic, then a dispute could be
significant in one context and not in another, so long as the theoretical background shifts
accordingly. Our account of significance should be flexible enough to accommodate
those shifts.
All of this raises the question of how my distinction relates to the VFD. Is it
meant to respect the same judgments about cases and to explain precisely the same
phenomena? I don't intend the distinction to overlap with the VFD, so that our
judgments about which disputes are insignificant or not will always agree with our
judgments about which disputes are verbal or not. In fact, I think that some verbal
disputes can be significant and some factual disputes can be insignificant. Thus my
concept of the predicate is included in some way in that of the subject, praedicatum inest subjecto." (quoted
in Robert Adams (1994, p. 57)) and "the predicate... is always in the subject... and the nature of truth in
general... consists in this very thing." (Leibniz (1989, p. 31)). I am not a Leibniz scholar, so I stand open
to correction if I have misrepresented his views.
" Here I am relying on Benson Mates, who writes: "The propositions ordinarily considered most basic by
Leibniz are those expressed by simple sentences of the form 'A is B,' possibly supplemented by the
quantifiers 'some,' 'no,' or 'all.' He seems to think-because of his nominalistic metaphysics, as I
conjecture-that whatever can be said at all can be expressed in such propositions." (1986, p. 54)
18 An example of a significant yet verbal dispute might be the following: suppose two people disagree over
whether John is late. The two disputants, along with John, are members of an organization that has strict
penalties for those who are late to their meetings. The two disputants agree about when John arrived but,
due to their associating different standards of precision with "late," disagree over whether he was late and,
therefore, whether the penalties should apply. Here the dispute arises from some semantic divergence
between the disputants, but it is still significant: it will affect what happens to John, it will affect how the
organization's rules and regulations are interpreted from then on, it will affect how the term "late" is used
in similar circumstances, and so on. An example of a non-verbal dispute that is insignificant might be a
dispute about how many times the letter "e" occurs in my copy of Kant's 1st Critique. Plausibly, the
resolution of this dispute is not at all important for our theoretical interests (assuming, for instance, that we
don't have some psychological theory linking the prevalence of certain letters in an author's text with some
personality disorder) and is, therefore, insignificant, even though it is not verbal in the sense at issue here (it
proposed distinction is not simply an alternative analysis of the VFD with another name.
Nonetheless, they are not entirely unrelated. As I've noted, the VFD is meant to play a
certain philosophical role and we can identify that role independently of the distinction
thought to fulfill it. What my distinction has in common with the VFD is that I think it's
the best candidate for a distinction that can play that role (given, as I've argued above,
that the VFD cannot): explaining the difference between worthwhile and defective
disputes, and providing some guidance concerning which disputes to take seriously. The
two distinctions will diverge concerning precisely which disputes are worth taking
seriously, but the theoretical work they are meant to do is the same.
At this point, one might wonder: is every dispute significant, on this view? Every
dispute has some consequences, since it bears on who is right in that particular
disagreement. We can always construe it as contributing to the enterprise of resolving
disputes like these, where these are related to one another but not to anything else.
Indeed, I think many people suspect metaphysics, or perhaps just ontology, as falling into
precisely into this sort of category. How are we to distinguish cases like these from those
where the consequences really do matter?
On my view, the insignificant disputes are the insular ones. The problem just
raised is that perhaps all disputes, no matter how insular they appear, could be construed
as having consequences for our theorizing. Thus there may not be any insignificant
disputes, on my account, or at least no way to establish that some dispute really is
insignificant.
How threatening this objection is depends on what we expect to get out of an
account of significance. Does the observation that there is never a guarantee of
insignificance undermine my account? Consider the explanatory and the methodological
applications of the view separately. The observation will threaten the explanatory
application if one thinks there is a clear line to be drawn between the significant and
insignificant disputes, since it will show that it's impossible to say where exactly the line
is to be drawn. However, I am comfortable admitting that significance comes in degrees.
That shouldn't be surprising or unsettling if significance is determined by a dispute's
is, in some sense, about language, but not in the sense that makes it verbal, since it is a wholly factual
question about how many physical bits of ink of a certain kind appear on certain pieces of paper).
theoretical role, since different disputes might have greater or lesser influence on our
theorizing. So, even if every dispute can be construed as having some theoretically
interesting consequences, what should be uncontroversial is that some have many more,
or far fewer, interesting theoretical connections than others. In that case, what the
objection shows is that no disputes have absolutely no significance, which is a far less
threatening result, since we can still point out that many disputes are highly insignificant,
far more so than those that we want to take seriously.
Whether this is a methodological problem depends on how well we're able to
distinguish, in practice, disputes that are objectionably insular from those that are not. I
think our ability here is generally quite good. This is especially clear when the disputes
occur outside of highly theoretical disciplines like philosophy, where disputes are often
resolved on the basis of our ability to recognize that they have no bearing on anything (as
in obvious cases of verbal disputes, like William James squirrel case). In less
straightforward cases, the difficulty is just that of understanding the dispute itself: it can
be unclear, when a debate is still ongoing, what its causes are, or what is at stake in it, or
whether it will have interesting consequences for other issues. Once those features
become clear, it also becomes clear whether the dispute is objectionably insular. The
difficulty arises in identifying the dispute's theoretical role, but I don't think we need a
special methodology for that, we can just let the dispute play out and see what comes of
it.
This might still seem unsatisfactory. It certainly does not provide us with
foolproof criteria. 19  From this perspective, my view might be better understood as
follows: there is no methodology for determining whether a dispute is significant, but this
shouldn't worry us because, if my view is correct, no methodology is expected or needed.
Not expected, because there are many ways that a dispute can be relevant to our
theorizing and there is no reason to think that they can all be subsumed under a single
methodology. Not needed, because whether a dispute is significant depends on factors
that we are antecedently good at detecting. That does not, of course, mean that there
won't be hard cases, but the difficulty here is the sort that arises whenever we must rely
19 It does provide some guidance, however, by clarifying what kinds of considerations are relevant when
evaluating the significance of some dispute.
on our judgment rather than on some predetermined decision procedure. On my view
that sort of difficulty may well be ineliminable, but I think that will be so on any
reasonable view. Trying to determine which disputes are significant is like trying to
determine which horses to bet on; there are no wholly foolproof criteria that could
provide a fixed methodology, but we can make clear what considerations are relevant and
refine our judgments nonetheless.
This methodological point is important. I think it lies at the heart of the mistake
made in traditional applications of the VFD. It shares much in common with the mistake
made by the logical positivists in their search for a criterion of meaningfulness, and in
many other philosophical projects. It can be tempting to answer difficult philosophical
questions by first seeking out an explicit methodology or a rule that can be relied on to
guide us in answering those questions. Faced with the question "When is a linguistic
expression meaningful?" we are tempted to look for explicit criteria of meaningfulness
first, and to then apply those criteria in difficult cases. But we've learned that often, as
with meaningfulness, this temptation leads us astray. Often the criteria are inadequate,
giving us too narrow a view of the phenomena, and when they are adequate we're often
deceived about how much work they are really doing, with our judgments driving the
application of the rule and not the other way around. This approach is not always
misguided, but there is a history of cases in which we were led astray by our reliance on a
principle when we didn't really need one. Much of the appeal of the VFD stems from the
fact that it promises to give us a rule for dividing the worthwhile disputes from the
defective ones, but I think this is precisely one of those cases where a rule will not serve
us well. Similarly, the attempt to determine in the abstract which expressions are
meaningful was closely related to the attempt to determine the prior epistemological
constraints that a research program (in science or philosophy) must satisfy if it is to have
any content or hope of success. Over time it became clear that this project was also
doomed; we just cannot always tell beforehand which lines of inquiry will bear fruit.
Nonetheless, many recent discussions of metaphysics and ontology, and the philosophy
of philosophy more generally, adopt a very similar viewpoint. They assume that we can
discover some prior principle, like the VFD, for distinguishing at the outset the
worthwhile disputes from the defective ones. More generally they seek to discover the
prior constraints that philosophical activities, like ontology, must satisfy in order to be
worthwhile. I think this approach is mistaken. Even setting aside any pessimistic
inductions, we can only go so far in replacing our reliance on good philosophical
judgment with more philosophical theory.20 That's not to say that we can't make
progress through metaphilosophical reflection, just that such reflection should not be a
search for foolproof recipes. My hope is that the view I have developed here avoids these
pitfalls.
1.4 Conclusion
Summing up, I have argued that the distinction between verbal/factual disputes
cannot explain the difference between defective disputes and those worth taking
seriously, and cannot guide us in distinguishing between them either. A more promising
alternative is to look to the role played by a dispute, or its place in our theoretical
activities, to see whether it is significant or not. Those that have an impact on our
broader theorizing are significant, while insular disputes are not.
20 This approach also suffers from a fairly serious regress problem, since we're left with the problem of
adjudicating between rival metaphilosophical theories.
Chapter 2
The Significance of Ontological Disputes
For much of the 2 0 1h century, philosophers were suspicious of metaphysics,
regarding metaphysical disputes as somehow defective or vacuous, perhaps resting on
linguistic mistakes or confusions. As the views underpinning these suspicions, like
logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy, became less widely accepted,
metaphysics underwent a revival, with ontology-the study of what exists-taking on a
central role. But many remain suspicious of metaphysics all the same and various new
and sophisticated attempts have been made to demonstrate that metaphysical disputes
(and ontological disputes in particular) are more problematic than the new
metaphysicians have supposed. In light of this, we should not naively suppose that
ontology is in good standing. We should ask: are ontological disputes worth taking
seriously?
I think many ontological disputes are worth taking seriously. In this chapter, I
will explain why. In the previous chapter I articulated a way of understanding when
disputes are significant, or worth taking seriously, according to which a dispute is
significant if it related to the rest of our theorizing in the appropriate way. So, in order to
see whether ontological disputes are significant, I will be exploring the question of
whether they have the right kind of theoretical consequences.
Although ultimately we have to settle the question of significance on a case by
case basis, considering the details of each dispute on its own, I will argue that we have
good reason to think that many familiar ontological disputes are significant. I will do so
by first considering some representative examples and describing the relevance they have
for various issues outside of ontology, thus providing primafacie reason to think they are
significant. Then, I will respond to a more general worry about ontological disputes that
threatens to undercut their significance. I will argue that this general worry is not as
threatening as sometimes supposed, but that a specific version of it can, in some cases,
pose a real threat to the significance of ontological disputes.
2.1 Are Ontological Disputes Significant?
2.1.1 Significance
When is a dispute worth taking seriously? Here I will briefly sketch my answer to
this question, which I will rely on in what follows.2 I will call disputes worth taking
seriously "significant" and those that aren't "insignificant." Significant disputes, on my
view, are those that hook up with the rest of our theorizing in the right kind of way: they
are the product of prior disagreements, or their resolution would help resolve other
disputes or draw new distinctions or open new lines of research; generally, they have
some bearing on our broader theoretical projects. Insignificant disputes are insular: they
have no interesting connections to other theoretical projects; their resolution has no
bearing on anything beyond the dispute itself. More simply, significant disputes ramify
throughout the rest of our inquiry while insignificant disputes do not.
Significance contrasts with various other properties that a dispute might have.
Saying that a dispute is significant, in the sense I have described, is not the same as
saying that it is genuine or deep or substantive. Similarly, insignificant disputes are not
necessarily merely verbal or lacking objectively correct answers or vacuous in some other
way. The target notion that I mean to explicate in terms of connections to the rest of our
inquiry is a dispute's relevance, or its importance; the question of whether it is significant
is the question of whether it matters or is a waste of time and intellectual effort. I point
out these contrasts because many of my opponents disagree with me only indirectly.
Consider, for instance, the view that ontological disputes are merely verbal.
Insignificance is not the same as mere verbality, but I think mere verbality is sufficient
for insignificance.22 By arguing that ontological disputes are significant, I disagree with
the view that they are merely verbal, but in an indirect way. My suggestion is that we can
make matters simpler and less obscure by focusing directly on the issue of significance
rather than taking a more indirect route through mere verbality or substantivity.
There are, of course, various questions one might ask about how to understand the
suggestion that significance is a matter of theoretical connections (and insignificance a
matter of theoretical insularity) and it is not always straightforward how to answer them.
21 This is itself a difficult question and I don't mean to suggest that my view is obvious or uncontroversial.
I discuss it in more detail in the previous chapter.
22 I think the "mere" is crucial here. I leave open the possibility of significant yet verbal disputes.
Many of these points of uncertainty may become clearer once I have considered some
examples and shown how the view applies in practice, but some uncertainty is
unavoidable. I don't think we can find any account of the difference in question that
provides us with a mechanical methodology for determining whether some dispute is
worth taking seriously. In all cases we will have to rely on our judgment. What I hope is
that my view makes it clear what the relevant considerations are, so that we're in a good
position to exercise our judgment.
My defense of ontology will be no different. I will attempt to show, through
some examples, how ontological disputes can bear on the rest of our theorizing, but it
remains open for someone who disagrees to question whether the theoretical connections
I point out are sufficient to establish the significance of ontological disputes. I should
thus be regarded as trying to establish a primafacie case that they are significant, even if
the argument will have to continue on from there.
2.1.2 Possible Worlds
I want to begin with a dispute whose significance is, I hope, less controversial
than other disputes in ontology, in order to illustrate the idea that theoretical connections
are what makes for significance and to motivate the idea that ontological disputes can
have such connections. The dispute I have in mind is that between modal realists, like
David Lewis, and actualists, like Alvin Plantinga, Robert Stalnaker, and others, over the
existence of concrete possible worlds of the sort Lewis accepts. The dispute is
ontological in the straightforward sense, yet I think there is less temptation to think that it
is insignificant compared to examples more frequently discussed in the metaontology
literature, such as the persistence and composition debates. The reason, I think, is that
the wider theoretical relevance of the dispute concerning possible worlds is more obvious
than in those cases. Here I will point out some of the ways in which it is relevant.
Let's begin with its source. What, for instance, are Lewis's motivations for
accepting his account of possible worlds, in contrast with the actualist alternatives? In
On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis considers a wide range of theoretical work that
23 For Lewis's views, see Lewis (1986). For actualism, see Platinga (1974, 1976), chapter 3 of Stalnaker
(1987), and Stalnaker (2003).
possible worlds can perform.2 4  He notes that they can be used in explicating modal
notions (including not just necessity but counterfactuals and causation as well), in
developing a theory of content for speech and thought, in a theory of properties, and so
on. In many of these cases there is agreement between Lewis and actualists about the
role possible worlds can play, but two cases that are especially important to Lewis set
them apart. One, which appears again and again in On the Plurality of Worlds, is
eliminating primitive or unanalyzed modality. The second is giving a purely extensional
theory of properties on which properties are identified with sets of their instances.
Regarding the first, Lewis's thought is that modal notions can be explicated in
terms of possible worlds (e.g. necessity can be understood as truth in all possible worlds)
and possible worlds in turn can be understood in non-modal terms. They are simply
concrete universes, of the sort we inhabit, that are spatiotemporally isolated from one
another. Modal notions like necessity can then be understood in terms of quantification
over the space of possible worlds. No primitive modal notions are needed. On the
second point, Lewis favors a set-theoretic conception of properties.26 Though attractive,
the view that properties are just the sets of their instances (and that every set is a property
of its members) is open to a powerful objection from the existence of distinct yet co-
extensive properties, as in the famous example of renates and cordates. The sets in
question are identical, since they have the same members, but the properties, intuitively,
are not. Lewis's plurality of concrete possible worlds gives him a way out of the
problem: take properties to be sets of individuals from all possible worlds. Assuming
that being a renate is not necessarily co-extensive with being a cordate, then in some
world there is a renate, non-cordate (or the other way around) and so the set of all renates
is distinct from the set of all cordates.
These two applications of possible worlds set Lewis's apart from actualists who
accept an ontology of non-concrete or abstract possible worlds. His primary objection to
each of the actualist (or, in his terms, ersatz) alternatives he considers is that it is
24 See especially the first chapter of Lewis (1986).
25 That is, at least, how the picture is meant to work. I want to set aside, for now, the question of whether
Lewis really succeeds in eliminating any primitive modality and focus instead on the intended contrast
between his view and those of his opponents.
26 At times, he flirts with more robust conceptions of properties as universals (see Lewis (1983a), but
generally he relies on the set-theoretic view.
incapable of dispensing with primitive modality. In each case, some sort of primitive
modal notion is needed to make sense of what the actualist's possible worlds are. For
instance, in the version of actualism that takes possible worlds to be sets of sentences of
some kind, one needs a notion of consistency to distinguish between those sets of
sentences that serve as possible worlds from those that do not (an inconsistent set of
sentences could at best be an impossible world). But, Lewis argues, consistency is a
modal notion since it signals that the sentences in question could all be true together. We
might explain it by saying that a set of sentences is consistent if there is a world where
they are all true together, but that would be circular for the actualist in question. So some
notion of consistency must be taken as primitive (or some other modal notion taken as
primitive, in terms of which consistency can be explained).27
Similarly, it's clear that actualists cannot take properties to be sets in the same
straightforward way without running afoul of the co-extension problem. Many actualists
adopt a more realist attitude towards properties, taking them as primitive in some way
(some even employ them in their account of what possible worlds consist in, as in
Stalnaker (1987, p. 46)).
The suspicion of primitive modality and the set-theoretic conception of properties
are related in that they both find their motivation in the broad empiricist tradition that
regards primitive modality and intensionality as somehow mysterious or objectionable.
Furthermore, they rest on the view that at least conceptually there is a distinction between
the modal and the non-modal, for otherwise the project of eliminating primitive modality
is hard to make sense of.
In contrast, rather than viewing it as a disadvantage of their position, many
actualists are happy to accept unreduced modality and properties. Actualists often view
modality in particular as pervasive and primitive. Far from mysterious, modal notions
form part of our ordinary conception of the world, and although they might stand in need
of some regimentation for theoretical purposes, conceptually they are no more
problematic than so-called "non-modal" notions. I say "so-called" because many
actualists also endorse the view that there is no sharp distinction between the modal and
27 I am oversimplifying here by ignoring attempts to formulate a syntactic notion of consistency. Lewis
discusses this in more detail in section 3.2 of Lewis (1986).
the non-modal, or that many apparently non-modal notions are in fact modal, at least in
the sense that a proper understanding and application of them involves understanding
certain modal facts. As a result, many actualists view the project of eliminating primitive
modality as misguided, manifesting a misunderstanding of modality. Without this
motivation, there is less reason to think of possible worlds as concrete universes,
especially when combined with a willingness to take properties (or similar abstract
entities like states of affairs or essences) as primitive, rather than reducing them to sets.
Those entities can then be used to make sense of our talk of possible worlds.
Hence the dispute over concrete possible worlds has its source at least in part in
competing conceptions of modality and the prospects for reduction. Much of the
motivation for adopting a Lewisian ontology stems from an aversion to primitive
modality and intensionality. Those who do not share this aversion are free to adopt
alternative conceptions of possible worlds, as many actualists do, since although
actualists and modal realists agree about many of the theoretical roles that possible
worlds should play, providing a non-modal ground for modal notions is not a shared goal.
There is not, however, complete agreement over what roles possible worlds
should play, and those disagreements also help account for the significance of the dispute
over concrete possible worlds. I've already mentioned one such role, namely providing
the materials for a set-theoretic reduction of properties. Another point of divergence is
the scope of possibility. Some actualists (though not all 28) appeal to possible worlds
primarily as part of a theory of content (of mental states or other representations) and are
not interested in their more metaphysical uses. If possible worlds are to be used primarily
to help explain the behavior of rational agents in terms of the contents of their attitudes,
then one's conception of possible worlds need only be rich enough to capture those
possibilities that ordinary speakers are apt to recognize and distinguish between. Hence
one lacks the motivation for a more robust conception of possible worlds intended to
capture more bizarre or alien possibilities, which in turn might affect one's conception of
what possible worlds are. One reason to adopt the view that possible worlds are concrete
28 The actualist I'm describing here adopts a particularly instrumentalist conception of modality where
possibilities are no more fme-grained and extensive than human rational capacities require (there are not,
for instance, possibilities that we cannot describe or understand). Other actualists, in contrast, are closer to
Lewis on this point.
is to allow for certain bizarre possibilities that might really be out there, even if they
cannot be described or understood by us. An actualist of the sort I'm describing might
deny that there are any such possibilities, and hence see no reason to think that possible
worlds are the sorts of things that could really be out there, independently of our rational
activities.
Other prior disagreements are also relevant (for instance, different views about the
epistemological and metaphysical significance of the concrete/abstract distinction), but
let me turn from the source of the dispute to its consequences. Some of its consequences
are obvious from the foregoing: how the dispute plays out will affect what theoretical
roles possible worlds can play. For instance, as I've already mentioned, those who accept
concrete possible worlds can offer extensional accounts of various apparently intensional
phenomena, like properties, but also counterfactuals, causation and so on. That in turn
has consequences for what kind of language and ideology we employ in our theorizing,
or which and how many primitive terms we must employ. Other consequences are less
obvious from what I've said, but still important. The parties to the dispute might be
committed to different treatments of de re modality (counterpart theory vs. more
straightforward accounts of transworld identity), to different views about which modal
claims are true or false or meaningful at all (see, for instance, Alan McMichael (1983)),
to different semantics for terms like "actual," and so on. I won't discuss these points in
detail here; rather, my hope is to draw attention to the fact that it is because of these
points that many people are inclined to take the dispute over concrete possible worlds
seriously. The dispute has important ramifications for our theorizing in various domains
and its significance is due to those connections. So, I think the case serves as a model for
how to think about the significance of ontological disputes more generally.
2.1.3 Coincident Objects
Let me now turn to a case whose significance is more controversial: the dispute
over materially coincident objects. Consider the following disagreement. An artist has
two lumps of clay, one shaped like the upper half of Goliath, and the other shaped like
the lower half. At noon, the artist puts them together, thereby creating both a new lump
of clay and a new statue of Goliath, which he names "Lump" and "Goliath," respectively.
At 1:00, he smashes the object, thereby destroying both Lump and Goliath. Two people
observe these events, and are asked: from noon to 1:00, were there two, coincident things,
or was there only one thing? The first (who we will call "2-thinger") answers that there
were two, and the second ("1-thinger") that there was one.
Is their dispute significant? I think it is, and I will explain why in a moment, but
let me first note that the claim that it isn't does have a certain appeal. What, one might
wonder, could possibly be at stake here? They both agree about the configuration of
molecules occupying the relevant region of spacetime, about how much everything
occupying the relevant region weighs, and, more generally, about all the subvening
properties of the thing or things in question. It seems that all they disagree about is how
to describe whatever is there, or perhaps about certain identity statements (like "Goliath =
Lump") that seem fairly idle, given the rest of their agreements.
Though attractive, I think this line of thought is mistaken. The first thing to note
is that we can fill in the background of their dispute in such a way that it is not the result
of idle metaphysical speculation, but is prompted by a challenge to ordinary ways of
thinking about material objects. The disputants are brought to their positions by
reflecting on a paradox and their positions represent different ways of coping with
genuine tensions in their beliefs. For instance, suppose that prior to their disagreement
both 1-thinger and 2-thinger began by accepting the following three claims:
1. Leibniz's Law (i.e. if x is identical to y, then x and y have all the same
properties).
2. Distinct material objects cannot occupy exactly the same region of spacetime.
3. Lump could have survived changes that Goliath could not and vice versa.
From these claims, we can derive a contradiction, as follows: Lump and Goliath
both occupy exactly the same region of spacetime, so by claim 2, they are identical. We
can also assume, as an instance of claim 3, that Lump could have survived being
squashed into a ball while Goliath could not have survived that change. However, given
Leibniz's Law, it follows from the identity claim just established that Goliath could have
survived being squashed into a ball, while Goliath could not have survived that change,
which is inconsistent.
2-thinger and 1-thinger's divergent reactions to the case can be seen as divergent
attempts to resolve this paradox, with 2-thinger abandoning the claim that material
objects cannot spatiotemporally coincide (claim 2), and 1-thinger denying that Leibniz's
Law applies in this case, perhaps by reinterpreting the sentences attributing modal
properties to Lump and Goliath so that they don't attribute the same properties when
different names are used to pick out the thing in question. She thereby blocks the
inference from the identity of Lump and Goliath, plus Leibniz's Law, to the inconsistent
modal claim. 2-thinger's reaction leads him to think that Goliath and Lump are distinct
but perfectly coincident, while 1-thinger's leads her to think that Goliath and Lump are
identical, even though something can be true of that thing qua Goliath that is not true of it
qua Lump and vice versa.
That the disagreement is prompted by different reactions to a tension in their
beliefs lends some support to the claim that the disagreement is significant, but we should
also consider whether the positions they arrive at would have different consequences for
issues beyond the dispute itself. Does their disagreement bear on other issues, outside
their dispute and outside of ontology? I think there are a number of important
connections. They are explored in more detail in various papers by David Wiggins
(1968), Alan Gibbard (1975), Lewis (1986, chapter 4), Theodore Sider (2001), Kit Fine
(2003), Karen Bennett (2009) and others, but I will summarize some of them in order to
make their relevance clear.
One consequence is that 2-thinger and 1 -thinger are committed to different
conceptions of de re modal predication. 1-thinger's response to the problem requires her
to adopt a semantics on which one cannot simply substitute co-referring proper names in
de re modal predications while preserving truth value. Given that she accepts that
Goliath = Lump, such a semantics is required to block the inference from "Lump could
survive a change that would destroy Goliath" to "Goliath could survive a change that
would destroy Goliath." There are different ways of achieving this goal; one familiar
route would be to adopt a Lewisian semantics in terms of counterparts, but there are other
options. The unifying idea behind these options is that the properties attributed to a thing
by predicates like "could survive being squashed into a ball" vary along with the name
used to pick out that thing, so that the same predicate can apply to a thing under one
name and fail to apply under another name.29 In that case, despite the fact that the same
predicate is used in both the consistent and the inconsistent predications, the same
property is not being attributed by those predications, and so Leibniz's Law cannot be
used to derive a contradiction.3 0 On a counterpart semantics, the property picked out by
the predicate depends on the counterparts picked out by the counterpart relation: "could
survive being squashed into a ball" picks out the property of having this counterpart (the
one picked out by the relevant relation), who survives being squashed into a ball.
Furthermore, if one thinks that the counterpart relation is fixed, at least in part, by how
one refers to the object in question (e.g. "Goliath" fixes the statue counterpart relation,
while "Lump" fixes the lump of clay counterpart relation), then the property attributed
varies along with the name, since the name varies the counterpart relation.
Thus 1 -thinger will be committed to various theses in the philosophy of language
(exactly which theses will depend on how she spells out her view). She maintains
metaphysical consistency by adjusting her semantics. 2-thinger, on the other hand, incurs
no such commitments from his view; he might adopt those views for independent
reasons, but as far as this dispute is concerned, he is free to treat de re modal predications
as he likes.
This particular consequence is really an instance of a more general consequence.
The divergence between their views will not be isolated to the semantics of modal claims.
Following Fine (2003), there is reason to think that modal properties are not the only
properties that (seem to) distinguish Lump and Goliath. Depending on the case, it might
be that Goliath is poorly made but Lump isn't, or that Goliath is valuable but Lump isn't,
or that Goliath is well insured but Lump isn't, or that Goliath is the referent of "Goliath"
29 There is an alternative to the Lewisian view according to which the property attributed is the same and
the counterpart story only affects the evaluation of whether the object possesses the property. In that case,
we should say that whether the thing has the property in question depends on whether it is referred to as
"Goliath" or "Lump," as opposed to saying that which property is attributed depends on whether we refer
to the thing as "Goliath" or "Lump." Both interpretations block the inference involving Leibniz's Law,
though the second might require us to abandon or at least modify the law in some way.
3 It's tempting to describe the idea as follows (though it's not clear that a counterpart theorist could
consistently say this): Lump does have the property attributed in "Goliath could survive such-and-such a
change," even if it lacks that attributed in "Lump could survive such-and-such a change." It possesses the
first property only qua Goliath.
but Lump isn't, and so on. If so, and if 1 -thinger appeals to the same strategy for dealing
with these cases, then predications like "Goliath is valuable," "Goliath is poorly made"
and "Goliath is the referent of 'Goliath'," as well as many others, will require special
semantic treatment, in the same way as de re modal predications. The result will be an
even greater divergence between 2-thinger's and 1-thinger's views in the philosophy of
language.
Another, related consequence of the dispute is that 2-thinger and 1 -thinger are
committed to different views about identity. In particular, they are committed to different
answers to the question of whether identity can be contingent. 1-thinger is committed to
the claim that identity can be contingent, in the sense that the following can be true:
Goliath is identical to Lump, but there is a world where Goliath and Lump both exist yet
are not identical. Generally, that is because 1 -thinger thinks that Goliath and Lump are
identical yet have different modal properties (e.g. Lump could survive being squashed
into a ball but Goliath couldn't). We can assume that in some world, the relevant
difference is realized: the thing is squashed, Lump survives, and Goliath does not. In that
world, the two are not identical, yet both exist (at some time or other). Alternatively,
continuing in a Lewisian vein, depending on the counterpart relation in question there
may be a world where the thing in question has two distinct counterparts, one a lump of
clay and one a statue, thus making true the claim that Lump and Goliath could have been
distinct. 2-thinger, on the other hand, is not committed to any such views about
identity.3 1
These consequences have further consequences. A disagreement over whether
there can be contingent identity will generate disagreements about what is possible, and
disagreements concerning the space of possible worlds can generate disagreements over
what is intelligible or conceivable and what isn't. A simple example is that 2-thinger and
1 -thinger might disagree about whether it's conceivable for Goliath and Lump to be
31 Putting this point in terms of contingent identity might be a bit misleading. 1-thinger need not accept that
identity can be contingent in the sense that Saul Kripke (1971) famously argued against. On the Lewisian
version of this view, the claim that Goliath and Lump are contingently identical can be understood as
shorthand for the real story in terms of counterpart relations, and since a thing and its counterparts in other
worlds are never really identical (in the strict sense), there is a clear sense in which there are no contingent
identities in Lewis's system. Nonetheless, putting things in terms of contingent identity is not entirely
inaccurate either, especially since people who adopt the 1-thing view often characterize their view in those
terms (see, for instance, Gibbard (1975)).
distinct. These disagreements open up the possibility of more interesting disagreements;
for instance, 1 -thinger's commitments remove at least one barrier to the intelligibility of
certain theses in the philosophy of mind (like the view that mental states are contingently
identical with brain states or that persons are contingently identical with their bodies),
theories that 2-thinger should find unintelligible in principle.
There are additional consequences of the disagreement that are somewhat more
general and difficult to pin down. One is that 2-thinger and 1-thinger are committed to
different views about how our epistemic situation constrains the existence claims we can
justifiably accept. For instance, 2-thinger thinks that there can be two distinct objects
even if there are no observational differences between them and no way to detect, by
ordinary empirical means, that there are two things rather than one. This commitment
might require him to reject some (perhaps naive) versions of verificationism or
antirealism. Regardless of whether there is a specific view that he must reject here, 2-
thinger and 1-thinger's disagreement might lead to additional disagreements over certain
epistemic claims concerning when we're justified in believing identity claims (or their
negations), how we distinguish objects from one another, and so on.
There is, as I mentioned before, a temptation to think that the dispute here is
insignificant, but I think that once we see what prompts the disagreement, and what
additional disagreements are prompted thereby, it becomes highly plausible that the
dispute is significant. Its resolution would have an impact on the philosophy of language,
epistemology, and other areas of inquiry. In my discussion I have focused on a fictional
dispute, but the details are drawn from actual disagreements between philosophers. Of
course, in actual philosophical disputes, it can be difficult to neatly separate out what,
exactly, is the source of a dispute, what is a consequence of it, and what is an argument
used to defend a view, but the connections between the dispute and our wider theoretical
concerns are fairly clear and I don't think my treatment of the case distorts the actual
facts in problematic ways.
How many other familiar ontological disputes are significant on this view is a
question that I will leave unanswered for now. As I hope is clear from the above,
answering this question in difficult cases-such as the dispute over when and how often
composition occurs-will require careful attention to the details of the case in question.
For reasons of space, I can't discuss all the interesting cases here, though I suspect that
many other familiar disputes will turn out to be significant, once we look carefully at the
puzzles that produce them and the consequences they might have for various other
branches of philosophy.
2.2 Difference Minimization
I turn now to some general reasons for resisting the claim that ontological
disputes are significant. The main threat to the significance of ontological disputes is that
they appear to be difference minimizing. There are different ways for a dispute to be
difference minimizing, but the common feature of such disputes is that the differences
between the two positions regarding issues outside the dispute itself can be minimized or
eliminated by various means, either through reinterpretation of other disputed claims or
by some kind of translation or paraphrase of the claims in question. The end result is that
the dispute has little or no bearing on other issues, for regardless of who ends up being
correct, the relevant difference minimizing mechanism will ensure that the same
consequences follow.
Not all difference minimization threatens a dispute's significance. It is possible to
minimize the differences between the disputed positions in some respects but not others.
Philosophers on opposite sides of some dispute might come to find common ground on
some issues but not all; in that case, the differences between their positions might be
partially but not completely minimized. Their disagreement is not as wide-ranging as it
seemed. That kind of partial difference minimization, though it may reduce a dispute's
degree of significance, need not undermine it completely. However, enough partial
difference minimization can be just as threatening as complete difference minimization,
for the straightforward reason that we should lose interest in a dispute as its significance
nears zero and not only when it reaches zero (I discuss this more in section 2.2.2).
Are ontological disputes difference minimizing? It's clear that they are at least
partially difference minimizing. Often ontologists on opposing sides of some dispute will
both find ways to reconcile their views with certain claims of common sense, in order to
avoid the accusation of rejecting certain Moorean facts. Although (as I will discuss later)
1I am borrowing this phrase from Bennett (2009), but I am not using it in exactly her sense.
this practice might pose a threat to significance, in some cases it is fairly innocuous, since
finding points of agreement with one's opponent is not, on its own, enough to undermine
a dispute's significance. The real question, then, is whether ontological disputes are
difference minimizing to an objectionable degree, enough to undermine their significance
(in what follows, I will drop the qualifications when using the phrase "difference
minimizing," unless noted otherwise).
There are at least two general reasons for thinking they are. I will explore them in
turn.
2.2.1 Translation
One frequently discussed idea is that ontological disputes are insignificant
because the different ontological theories defended by the participants in those disputes
can be translated into one another without loss. Another way to put the idea is that given
the correct theory of meaning, each participant could express their beliefs using only
sentences that their opponent would also accept. If that is the case, then it's plausible that
these ontological disputes are completely difference minimizing: if the opposing
positions can be translated into one another without remainder, it's hard to see how the
dispute over which is correct could have much bearing on any theoretically important
question. Regardless of who is right, the results would be the same.
The most well known proponent of this idea in recent discussions is Eli Hirsch
(2005, 2009). On Hirsch's view, ontological disputes are merely verbal if "each side can
plausibly interpret the other side as speaking a language in which the latter's asserted
sentences are true." (Hirsch (2009, p. 231)) Even setting aside the question of whether
ontological disputes are merely verbal, 3 Hirsch's condition does threaten the significance
of the disputes in question; if each side agrees that what the other says is true on some
plausible interpretation, it's hard to see how their positions could have different
ramifications for anything else. It would be irrelevant which side turns out correct, for
the same things will follow regardless. There could at most be a question about which
3I argued in chapter 1 that the verbal/factual distinction is unfortunate in various ways, so that we're better
off employing other classifications.
language we do or should speak, as Hirsch argues, but that is not the sort of question that
ontologists are interested in.
How does the view work in practice? The basic idea is to find interpretations-
assignments of coarse-grained truth conditions, on Hirsch's view--of the disputants'
utterances according to which each can agree that what the other says is true. Consider
how the view might apply to the Lump/Goliath dispute we discussed above. Suppose 2-
thinger says "There are 2 distinct things, Goliath and Lump" while 1 -thinger says "There
is only 1 thing, Goliath and Lump are identical." To undermine the dispute, a proponent
of Hirsch's view might recommend that they understand each other as follows. First,
from 1-thinger's point of view, 2-thinger seems to think that objects have more fine-
grained identity conditions than 1-thinger accepts. Despite being identical in all
observable and categorical respects, 2-thinger distinguishes objects on the basis of their
modal properties. What 1 -thinger needs to make sense of 2-thinger's utterance are things
that he could be referring to that are more fine-grained than ordinary (according to 1-
thinger) objects like statues or lumps of clay. One option is to understand 2-thinger's
objects as pairs of 1-thinger's objects and individuation conditions, where those can be
understood as specifications of de re modal properties. Thus when I-thinger hears 2-
thinger say "Goliath and Lump are distinct," she should understand him to mean "(Object
A, statue individuation conditions) and (Object A, lump of clay individuation conditions)
are distinct," something that 1-thinger can agree is true.3 4
From 2-thinger's perspective, the issue is reversed. 1-thinger thinks that objects
are more coarse-grained than 2-thinger does. He needs to find some object in his
ontology that completely overlaps both Lump and Goliath and could serve as the referent
of "Lump" and "Goliath" in 1-thinger's utterances. One option is the spatiotemporal
worm or world-slice that might be thought of as Lump and Goliath minus their modal
properties. The thought is that on 2-thinger's view, we can distinguish between ordinary
objects, like statues and lumps of clay, that are individuated at least partially on the basis
of their modal properties, and spacetime worms that are individuated solely on the basis
of their non-modal properties (alternatively, we might think that absolutely all of their
3 "Object A" here is meant to refer to the object that is both Goliath and Lump in 1-thinger's view.
properties are essential, which will have the same result).3 5 Assuming, as we have, that
Lump and Goliath exist for the same length of time and are only distinguished by their
modal properties, Goliath's spacetime worm is the same as Lump's. 36 Thus 2-thinger can
interpret 1-thinger as referring to that spacetime worm with both "Goliath" and "Lump,"
in which case 2-thinger can agree that 1-thinger speaks truly in saying "Goliath and
Lump are identical."
To be sure that these interpretations are plausible, we would have to consider
various different utterances that each disputant might make about Goliath, Lump, statues
and lumps of clay in various different contexts, but for now this should give us a good
grip on how the translation idea is meant to work. From the outside, we can find ways
for each disputant to understand their opponent's utterances in terms of their own view,
ways on which what their opponent says is true. Of course, each would reject the
interpretation of their utterances that their opponent might accept (e.g. 2-thinger would
insist that Goliath is a statue, an ordinary concrete thing and not some construction out of
coarse-grained objects and individuation conditions), but from the outside, one can see
how the availability of these translations could pose a threat to the significance of the
dispute. If we're willing to adopt these interpretations, then why does it matter which
way the dispute plays out?
Although I agree that ontological disputes are insignificant if the ontological
theories are translatable in this sense, I think it's much harder to establish that they are in
fact translatable than is often supposed. In these toy examples we can, of course, just
stipulate how each should translate the other, but in actual practice we need to make sure
that the translations in question are plausible to all involved (we don't, for instance, want
our views on meaning to be dictated by our desire to deflate certain ontological
disagreements). I think, however, that there are principled reasons for thinking that this
cannot be established without begging the question, at least not in any straightforward
way.
* This way of putting things makes it sound like 2-thinger can't think that ordinary objects are spacetime
worms, but that is unintentional. The crucial point is that he recognize a category of objects whose modal
properties play no nontrivial role in their identity conditions.
36 On this view, 2-thinger might better be understood as a 3 (or more)-thinger, Goliath, Lump and worm. I
will set that complication aside.
To see why, it will be helpful to discuss an important insight offered by Lewis
(1990). Lewis is concerned with how to understand Richard Routley's claim to be a
noneist, someone who does not believe in any of the more metaphysically controversial
entities (like past and future things, unactualized possibilia, abstract objects, properties,
and so on). The difficulty is that though he claims to be a noneist, Routley is happy to
quantify over those things that do not, according to him, exist. That is, though he accepts
"There are numbers" he does not accept "Numbers exist." More generally, he accepts
"There are some things that don't exist." In other words, Routley thinks there are two
different kinds of quantification, one that is existentially loaded and is expressed by terms
like "exist," and one that is existentially neutral and is expressed by terms like "some" or
"there are."
Speaking for what he calls the orthodox view, Lewis argues that Routley is better
understood as an allist, at least by people who share Lewis's metaphysical views. For
Lewis does not accept that there are two different kinds of quantification. According to
Lewis, "There are numbers" means the same as "Numbers exist." Given that we
(supposing we agree with Lewis) accept these equivalences, how are we to understand
ourselves in relation to Routley, and vice versa? Does he really reject the existence (in
our sense) of numbers? Lewis thinks not; our one and only kind of quantification is best
understood as corresponding to Routley's neutral quantification. On this view, Routley
accepts a distinction that we don't among the things that, according to us, exist: there are
also those things that Exist in some more loaded sense that we don't recognize. Thus we
should not take Routley at his word. On our view he is an allist, not a noneist, for he
accepts the existence of all the controversial entities in the only sense of existence that we
recognize. That he also accepts a further notion that we do not (what he calls
"existence") and applies it only to the more uncontroversial entities is beside the point.
Just as many people are unconvinced by Berkeley's insistence that he really does believe
in the existence of trees in the quad (precisely because he doesn't believe in what we
mean by "tree"), we should not think that Routley is a noneist, as he claims.
The details of Routley's case are not my main concern here. More important is
the general insight that Lewis is defending: the idea that how we interpret a philosopher's
claims often depends on our own philosophical position. As he puts it:
Why all this fuss over translation? Routley writes in English, after all. Is he not
the final authority on his own position? Should we not translate him
homophonically? No. He is the final authority on his position, but not on ours.
Therefore he does not have the final word either on how his position should be
expressed in our language, or on how ours should be expressed in his. Nor do we.
There is no authoritative final word; we can only seek the translation that makes
him make sense to us, and us to him. (p. 26)
And earlier:
[W]hether 'we' may take a philosopher at his word depends crucially on who
'we' are, and what philosophical premises we ourselves argue from. That is
distressing. (p. 24)
Distressing or not, the point is important for our question of whether the ability to
translate ontological positions into one another undermines their significance. For what I
think Lewis's point shows is that whether we regard two ontological positions as
translatable into one another itself depends on our prior ontological beliefs. There is no
question of finding an ontologically neutral translation.
I've already indicated how this might pose a problem in the Goliath/Lump case
above. Although 1-thinger can find a way to validate 2-thinger's utterances, and vice
versa, each will reject the other's attempts to reinterpret their utterances, for each relies
on metaphysical assumptions that the other rejects. On 1-thinger's interpretation of 2-
thinger, "Goliath" does not refer to a statue (at least not to what 2-thinger thinks is a
statue), but to a coarse-grained object of some kind together with individuation
conditions. On 2-thinger's interpretation of 1-thinger there are similar problems, since on
2-thinger's view statues and lumps of clay are distinct from the spacetime worms that 1-
thinger is taken to refer to. On that view, 1-thinger is understood as restricting her
attention to a sub-region of the true ontology, something that 1-thinger will deny. In each
case, the disputant's interpretation of their opponent rests on an ontological theory that
their opponent rejects. It gives each a way to understand the other, but not a way that is
neutral-a way that each can find plausible. And although we needn't think that theories
of meaning must be agreed on by everyone, the particular way in which these
interpretations fail to be neutral is crucial: they presuppose certain ontological claims that
are still up for grabs in the dispute itself. In that case, we can't evaluate their plausibility
independently of the ontological dispute and so they can't, in practice, give us reason to
abandon the dispute as insignificant.
In more general terms, Lewis's observations show that whether certain
ontological disputes appear significant to one will depend on one's own ontological
position, for one's ontological position helps determine what translations one finds
acceptable and hence how to interpret the participants in the relevant debate. Whether
one is correct about whether the dispute is significant will itself depend on whether one's
ontological position is correct. The upshot is that the claim that ontological disputes can
be translated into one another is not a neutral reason for regarding the dispute as
insignificant; rather, it must presuppose some ontological position of its own, a position
which might be at issue in the very dispute in question. We cannot, therefore, use
translatability as a reason for thinking that some ontological dispute is insignificant
without begging the question by assuming some position in the very debate in question.
A similar point arises from a qualification that Hirsch makes regarding his
position. Hirsch points out that his view may only apply to ontological disputes that have
reached the stage when "all is said and done," which Hirsch (quoting Lewis (1983b, p.
x)) describes as the point when "'all the tricky arguments and distinctions and
counterexamples have been discovered,' so that each position has achieved a state of
'equilibrium'" (Hirsch (2005, p. 80-81)). Before that stage is reached, it is always an
open possibility that some participant in the dispute will become convinced by their
opponent's arguments or retract their claims, something that Hirsch regards as
inexplicable unless the participants are interpreted as speaking the same language. At the
all-is-said-and-done stage, everyone is set in their views, and it is only then that we
should ask whether their positions are translatable, Hirsch argues. However, that is
precisely the point at which the dispute can be regarded as resolved by all parties,
including whoever is doing the translating; everyone will think they have weighed all the
available evidence and that their opponents are simply mistaken, not due to their
overlooking some considerations, but simply in what conclusion they draw from the
evidence. In other words, the question of translation only arises for Hirsch once one has
settled on some ontological position at the end of the relevant inquiry. While the dispute
is still ongoing, when it is still unsettled what the correct view is if there is one, we
cannot determine whether it is significant or not. This, I think, helps illustrate how the
question of whether the positions are translatable itself presupposes an answer to whether
and how the dispute has been resolved. It is not a question that can be answered
independently of resolving the dispute at issue and so is not the sort of reason that can be
offered in advance for regarding the dispute as insignificant.
Thus I do not think that translatability poses a serious threat to the significance of
ontological disputes. Not because it doesn't matter whether they are translatable, but
rather because whether they are so cannot be determined without taking a stand on the
ontological questions at issue. Hence even if some ontological positions are translatable,
so that a dispute between them would be insignificant, this is not something that can be
determined independently of that dispute, without first engaging in the real work of
ontology. Since I think most ontological disputes are still open, and the ontological
assumptions that underpin any attempt to demonstrate that rival ontological views are
translatable are themselves still up for debate, I do not see any compelling reason in this
line of thought for thinking that ontological disputes in general are not significant.
2.2.2 Paraphrase
A common feature of contemporary ontological disputes is the practice of
paraphrasing ordinary claims made outside ontology in order to render radical ontological
positions consistent with what are regarded as uncontroversial truths. Perhaps a
paradigm case of the kind of paraphrase I have in mind is W. V. 0. Quine's (1976b)
treatment of belief ascriptions. Quine's problem is the apparent commitment to
propositions carried by sentences of the form "S believes that p." Quine rejects the
existence of propositions; at the same time, he admits that many belief ascriptions of that
form are obviously true. The solution to this dilemma comes in the form of a paraphrase,
whereby Quine replaces sentences of the form "S believes that p" with those of the form
"S believes-true '...' in L."37 Reference to propositions is eliminated yet the truth of the
ordinary belief ascriptions is preserved.
The practice of paraphrasing ordinary claims in order to preserve their truth in the
light of apparent contradiction with firmly held theories is not unique to philosophy. For
example, in many contexts heliocentrists are happy to assert "The sun has just moved
behind the elms," even though that sentence, interpreted in a (perhaps perversely) strict
way, seems to imply that the sun moves through the sky, which is false on their view.
The apparent contradiction is resolved by recognizing that the sentence and others like it
could easily be paraphrased in other terms that do not have the same implication (they
could, for example, be systematically replaced with descriptions of the change in position
of the observer in relation to the sun due to the Earth's rotation).
Similar strategies are ubiquitous in contemporary ontology. For instance,
compositional nihilists who deny that there are any composite objects often try to
paraphrase ordinary claims about composite objects into their preferred terms in order to
show that despite their radical ontological views, they need not deny claims of ordinary
common sense. An example is given by Peter van Inwagen (1990), who paraphrases the
claim that there is a chair supporting him as he writes in the following sort of way:
The chair-receptacle R [the region of space thought to be occupied by a chair] is
filled with rigidly interlocking wood-particles; the regions immediately
contiguous with R contain no wood-particles; the wood-particles at the boundary
of R (that is, the wood-particles within R that are not entirely surrounded by
wood-particles) are bonded to nearby wood-particles much more strongly than
they are bonded to the non-wood-particles immediately outside R; the strength of
the mutual bondings of wood-particles within R is large in comparison with the
forces produced by casual human muscular exertions.
Using such paraphrases, ontologists are in a position to justify their own and
other's acceptance of claims that are apparently inconsistent with their ontological views.
The inconsistency is merely apparent, if the relevant claims are understood properly.
37 In intensional terms, the paraphrase is "S believes-true the sentence '...' that expresses p in L."
This kind of paraphrase might initially seem the same as the kind of translation
discussed in the last section, but they differ in several respects.38 First, their targets are
different. In the case of translation, the target sentences are those uttered by the
ontologists, especially the claims that characterize their ontological positions (like
"Goliath and Lump are distinct" or "Composite objects like tables do not exist."). In the
case of paraphrase, the target sentences are those uttered in ordinary contexts by people
not engaged in ontological investigations, like "I have more statues than lumps of clay in
my studio," uttered by an artist who is running low on unused pieces of clay. 39 Second,
their aims are different. In translation, the aim is to undermine the dispute, revealing it to
be vacuous or pointless by establishing some kind of equivalence between the disputed
positions. For that reason, the translations are usually undertaken by a third party to the
dispute or someone not initially engaged in the dispute who thinks that it is insignificant.
Furthermore, they are hostile: the disputants tend to resist the translations and regard
them as misrepresentations or misunderstandings of their claims. Paraphrase, on the
other hand, is undertaken by the disputants themselves with the aim of making their
positions more plausible. A common objection to compositional nihilism is that many
claims referring to tables are obviously true." The paraphrase strategy is in part a
response to these objections, since those claims can be paraphrased by others that the
compositional nihilist agrees are true. Though radical, their ontological position need not
contradict such uncontroversial truths, once they are properly interpreted. The
differences in the targets and aims of translation and paraphrase also lead to a difference
in their scope. The target sentences, in the case of translation, include all of those that the
ontologist might utter, including their most straightforward ontological claims. In the
case of paraphrase, the scope is limited. Though a compositional nihilist will paraphrase
ordinary claims involving tables (like "We have another table in the next room," uttered
by the host of a dinner party who is running out of space), they will insist that "Tables
38 These differences are most obvious in paradigm cases, but there may be cases of translation and
paraphrase that do not differ in these ways since the two shade into one another. The problem is
exacerbated by the fact that I'm using the terms "paraphrase" and "translation" in somewhat technical, or at
least unusually restrictive, senses.
39 This way of putting things isn't meant to require any deep distinction between ontological contexts and
ordinary contexts. That is just a helpful way to identify the set of sentences targeted in each case.
4 A particularly popular form of this objection appeals to common sense in a Moorean fashion to argue that
no radical ontological position that contradicts common sense could be true.
exist" is false, offering no paraphrase of it in less committal terms. Otherwise, they
would undermine their disagreement with those who do accept the existence of composite
objects. They must preserve a kernel of conflict in order to have a genuine disagreement.
Because of these differences, the threats posed by translation and paraphrase also
differ. Given its more limited scope, paraphrase does not necessarily pose a threat to
ontological disputes in the way translation does, for the differences between the disputed
positions are only partially minimized. Proponents of those positions will both accept
various ordinary claims about the disputed objects, but they will retain a core of
disagreement despite this. For instance, heliocentrists agree with their opponents that
"The sun has just moved behind the elms" is true in some contexts, but there are many
other sentences that they regard as false that are accepted by their opponents. Since those
sentences are not paraphrased or reinterpreted, much remains in dispute. Similarly in
ontology; in the above example, van Inwagen goes on to say that although he accepts the
claim I quoted above, he denies that there is something that fits exactly into R or that
there is something that the particles in R compose. Perhaps that leaves enough room for
significant dispute over the existence of chairs.
On the other hand, this limited scope also highlights the dangers of paraphrase.
For although it's true that, unlike in the case of translation, a kernel of genuine
disagreement is preserved, the paraphrases make salient the fact that the disagreement is
pared down to the absolute minimum, leaving the question of why it matters at all. As
more and more paraphrases are found for claims outside of ontology, the point of
disagreement between different ontological views becomes smaller and more obscure.
After a certain point the dispute becomes insignificant, for both disputants could adopt
the same views about all other issues. The worry is that many disputes in ontology
approach too close to this boundary. Both nihilists and universalists about composition
accept van Inwagen's paraphrase. What remains of their disagreement, perhaps, is that
they disagree about whether there is something that fits exactly into R, but it's hard to see
how that has important consequences for the rest of our theorizing. More generally, why
does a disagreement about whether "Tables exist" is true matter if the truth of all other
claims we might make about tables is unaffected due to the availability of paraphrases for
them?
This, I think, poses a genuine threat to the significance of ontological disputes and
I do not think it can be discharged in the same way as the threat posed by translation.
The problem with the translation idea was that any attempt to establish that the positions
really are translatable represents an additional partisan viewpoint in the debate itself with
no dialectical authority over the other positions involved. That is because translations
presuppose metaphysical positions that might be rejected by those involved in the
relevant dispute. Not so in the case of paraphrase, for the paraphrases are offered by the
disputants themselves in order to make their views more believable. They cannot,
therefore, rest on metaphysical assumptions that the disputants reject.41 In paraphrasing
ordinary claims, ontologists are telling us what their positions amount to but in the
process they undermine the interest in their positions by minimizing potential differences
between their own and their opponent's views. The further the process is carried out, the
more one loses a grip on what is at stake in the dispute.
Nonetheless, paraphrase does not pose a general threat to ontological disputes.
Unlike translation, paraphrase (of the sort we're discussing) is not imposed from without,
and it is an optional exercise. Ontologists don't have to offer alternative interpretations
of their views, or of others' views, in order to minimize the radical consequences of their
theories. It remains open simply to accept the conflicts. That, of course, comes at a cost:
it might make certain ontological positions more difficult to believe. But I think that
makes sense. Disputes over revisionary claims are often more significant than others for
their resolution has a greater impact on our theoretical projects; at the same time,
revisionary claims are harder to defend and render plausible than their more familiar
rivals. So there is a trade-off: ontological disputes are more significant the more the
involved positions take a stand on many different issues, but at the same time the more
they take such a stand, the more difficult it becomes to defend them. This is, I think, as it
41 Each might reject the other's paraphrases, but the crucial point is that they each accept their own and
hence each will find themselves in agreement with their opponent about the paraphrased claims. There
might, however, be a reason here to think that I have overestimated the threat. The threat comes from the
fact that paraphrase leads to widespread agreement about claims outside of ontology, but it might be
mitigated if the paraphrases the disputants offer are wildly different. In that case, although they agree about
the truth of ordinary claims, they will still disagree about what they mean or about why they are true. That
in itself might be enough to preserve the significance of the dispute. The point, however, is that whether
that is enough will depend heavily on the details of the case and even so, the paraphrases do at least
partially minimize the differences between the disputed positions. So, I do think it's still important to
recognize the potential threat that paraphrases pose, even if there are some mitigating factors.
should be, for it is a common feature of many theoretical disciplines, and I see no reason
to think that ontology should be any different.
2.3 Insignificant Ontological Disputes
So far I've been defending the significance of ontological disputes and responding
to various reasons for thinking they are insignificant. Despite this, I think it's important
to recognize that not all ontological disputes need be significant and there are compelling
reasons for thinking that some particular ontological disputes are not really worthwhile. I
will consider some in a moment.
It's difficult, however, to establish that any dispute is truly insignificant. My view
of significance naturally leads to a "wait-and-see" attitude when it comes to
insignificance, since new developments in a dispute, or in other areas of inquiry, always
have the potential to expose connections between that dispute and others. Part of my
criticism of various attempts to establish that certain disputes are insignificant (by
appealing to translations, or notions of mere verbality, or by other means) is that their
conclusions are premature, given the current stage of development of ontology. So in
claiming that some dispute is insignificant, there is always a real risk that one's judgment
is premature and will be proven wrong.
Yet our judgments are always open to correction in every area of inquiry and so
although we must recognize our fallibility, we can still offer evidence that certain
disputes are insignificant. The evidence is, I think, more compelling the more particular
it is. It's easier to argue that specific ontological disputes are insignificant, rather than
arguing from general principles that ontological disputes tend to be insignificant. The
strategy in each case would be to offer reasons for thinking that the dispute lacks
connections with the rest of our inquiry, so that regardless of which position in that
dispute turns out to be correct (if either), the effects on our inquiries will be the same.
So, let's consider what that evidence might look like.
Consider the disagreement between nominalists and Platonists over whether
mathematical objects, like numbers, exist.4 2 Traditionally philosophers have defended
4I intend for this to differ from the dispute over whether abstract objects of any sort (including properties,
contents, and so on) exist, which I think is a different matter altogether.
Platonism-the view that mathematical objects exist-by appealing to the theoretical
indispensability of mathematical objects to natural science and our understanding of the
world in general (as in, for instance, W.V.O. Quine (1951, 1960, 1980a) and Hilary
Putnam (1979a, 1979b)). In response, some nominalists (most notably Hartry Field
(1980)) have tried to show how our scientific theories might be reworked to avoid
reference to mathematical objects. I think it's plausible that a disagreement between
Platonists and nominalists of this sort is significant (since it may have important effects
on the shape of our scientific theories), but I mention it here only to set it aside. I want to
focus instead on a different yet closely related disagreement.
Consider instead the disagreement between what we might call (following Mark
Balaguer (1998)) Full-Blooded Platonism (FBP) and Fictionalist Nominalism (FN). FBP
is roughly the view that all possible mathematical objects exist (alternatively, all
internally consistent mathematical theories are true).43 According to FN, on the other
hand, mathematical claims are not literally true, because mathematical objects do not
exist. Instead, we think of ourselves as operating under the fiction that Platonism is true,
and we count mathematical claims as true so long as they are true according to the fiction
(or, roughly, would have been true had Platonism been true). This fiction is useful
because it allows us to theorize about the concrete world in ways that we could not
without it, and it constrains our use of mathematics in the same way that the truth of
Platonism would. So on FN, mathematical claims are literally false but we can
nonetheless make sense of their usefulness in science and elsewhere. 44
The defender of FBP holds that numbers exist while the proponent of FN holds
that they do not. Yet if developed in the right way, it's plausible that both FBP and FN
are fully consistent with our mathematical practice. 45 FBP, on the one hand, seems to
escape many of the traditional objections to Platonism that stem from our mathematical
practice. For example, working mathematicians seem to require nothing but consistency
and usefulness in order to regard some mathematical theory as true, but it's hard to find
43 I say "roughly" because there are difficulties with this formulation (for instance, anyone who thinks that
the existence of mathematical objects is a noncontingent matter will agree, reading the "possible" as
indicating metaphysical possibility). I think the formulation is clear enough for our purposes, but see Greg
Restall (2003) for more.
44 For more detail on the fictionalist strategy, see, among others, Steve Yablo (1998, 2002a, and 2002b),
Balaguer (1998), Joseph Melia (2000).
4' This is the general argument of Balaguer (1998)
an epistemology for traditional Platonism that makes sense of this. FPB fares much
better, for any consistent mathematical theory is true. On the other hand, FN does not
require us to rewrite our scientific theories in a language that does not quantify over
numbers, unlike the other version of nominalism I mentioned above. Apparent reference
to mathematical objects is explained as a descriptive aid and mathematical claims can be
treated as true for all scientific intents and purposes. So objections from the ubiquity and
usefulness of mathematics in natural science do not threaten EN.46
It would take us too far afield to go through all possible connections between
these two positions and the rest of our mathematical practice, but these observations
indicate that there is reason to think that both FBP and FN would have (or not have) the
same effects on the rest of our inquiry. If this line of thought is correct, they would
require us to think differently about the question of whether numbers exist but not much
else. Resolving the dispute one way or other would have little effect on practicing
mathematicians, scientists who employ mathematics, semanticists interested in
understanding mathematical discourse, epistemologists interested in our knowledge of
abstracta and other theorists. The fictionalist strategy underlying EN serves as a very
thorough difference minimizing mechanism, so even if the dispute between it and FBP is
genuine, there is reason to think it is insignificant.47
Another source of evidence of the insularity, and hence insignificance, of this
dispute is the indifference we find amongst those most likely to be effected by it (i.e.
practicing mathematicians).48 For a dispute to be significant, it must have connections
with other areas of inquiry. In some cases, it's clear where we should expect to find
those connections. Questions about the existence of numbers should affect those areas of
inquiry that involve numbers, if they have effects at all. Theorists who work in those
areas are, therefore, the most likely to take an interest in the dispute (among those not
46 Some might complain that this requires us to adopt a less than fully serious attitude about science,
regarding it as partly fictional. However, more recent developments of this approach dispense with the idea
of fictions and appeal to independently motivated linguistic mechanisms to explain how mathematical
claims can count as true even if numbers do not exist. See, for instance, Yablo (2009)
47 Not everyone agrees that it is genuine. Balaguer, for instance, thinks that there is no fact of the matter
about which view is correct. This seems to me an overreaction, but that goes beyond my primary concern
here.
48 Here the differences between FBP and traditional Platonism, and FN and traditional nominalism, are
perhaps less important (many mathematicians seem uninterested in both).
engaged in the dispute itself). So, if we find that they are thoroughly uninterested in the
dispute, we have some evidence that it lacks any connections and is thus insignificant.49
In this particular case, the question is whether mathematicians are concerned with
the outcome of the Platonism vs. nominalism disagreement. The issue is a bit tricky,
since the question should not be a purely sociological one. Many mathematicians do
have views on the metaphysics of mathematics and some do let it affect their practice.
Perhaps a better way to put the question is whether, from the perspective of working
mathematicians, discovering that nominalism or Platonism is true would be compelling
reason to abandon (or reconfigure in some nontrivial way) the field of mathematics. I
think it's plausible that most would say no. It might require them to adjust their
understanding of the metaphysics of mathematics, but it's doubtful that mathematics as a
science would disappear or change dramatically. Consider, for instance, some remarks
made by William Timothy Gowers in discussing the ontological status of ordered pairs in
light of the availability of multiple set-theoretic reductions of them:
I would contend that it [whether there are ordered pairs] doesn't matter because it
never matters what a mathematical object is, or whether it exists. What does
matter... about a piece of mathematical terminology is the set of rules
governing its use. (Gowers (2006, p. 192))
In this particular example, we can see why the disagreement between FBP and FN over
the existence of ordered pairs is irrelevant to a mathematician like Gowers, for both agree
on the rules governing mathematical terminology. Gowers goes on to say:
Suppose a paper were published tomorrow that gave a new and very compelling
argument for some position in the philosophy of mathematics, and that, most
unusually, the argument caused many philosophers to abandon their old beliefs
and embrace a whole new -ism. What would be the effect on mathematics? I
49This is highly defeasible evidence, of course. We must assume that these theorists are aware of the
dispute in question, that they understand it and have properly assessed its possible ramifications, and so on.
contend that there would be almost none, that the development would go virtually
unnoticed. (Gowers, (2006, p. 198))
We shouldn't draw too strong a conclusion from the claims of a single mathematician,
but Gower's outlook supports the idea that working mathematicians are not very
concerned with the outcome of the Platonism vs. nominalism dispute.50 That, I think,
provides some evidence that the dispute would have no impact on mathematics, which in
turn is some evidence that it is insignificant.
It would be overly hasty to think that any of the observations I've made in this
section establish that this particular ontological dispute is insignificant. The issue is far
too complicated to be settled by this brief treatment. What I've tried to do, however, is to
illustrate the kind of evidence that I think is compelling and the kind of arguments that
really do threaten ontological disputes. The best strategy is to find specific reasons for
thinking that the dispute in question is insular, rather than general principles that cast
doubt on ontology as a whole.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have tried to make it plausible that many ontological disputes are
significant. I argued for this first by discussing in detail some examples of ontological
disputes and how they bear on other theoretical pursuits, something that I regard as
sufficient for significance. I also considered some general reasons for accepting the
opposite conclusion and argued that they are not universally compelling, while
illustrating a more promising strategy for those who doubt the significance of ontology.
Some issues remain, such as how far my claim that ontological disputes are significant
can be generalized, but I hope to have made the initial case that ontological disputes are
worth taking seriously.
50 I think Gower's remarks are much more plausible in the case of the FBP vs. FN dispute, rather than all
possible Platonism vs. nominalism disputes, for some such disputes could lead to genuine differences in the
rules that govern our usage of mathematical terminology (for instance, some nominalists might eliminate its
usage altogether).
Chapter 3
Structure and Significance in Metaphysics
Metaphysics has long been the target of criticism in philosophy. From Hume's
critiques down to the logical positivists, the very existence of metaphysics as a field of
inquiry has been a point of controversy for many philosophers. In recent times, many
philosophers have continued this tradition and metaphysics has attracted new and
sophisticated criticisms. At the same time, however, it has also attracted a number of
defenders. These defenders argue that metaphysics is a worthwhile form of inquiry and
that metaphysical disputes-like those over the existence of composite objects, over the
nature of possible worlds, and so on-are not a waste of time.
The most well-known attempts to defend metaphysics have much in common. In
particular, they appeal to a family of notions, taken as primitive, that are meant to explain
what metaphysics is about and why we should care about it. Such notions include
structure, fundamentality, something's being the case in Reality. Most of these notions
also have uses in ordinary contexts, but in this case something more is meant. They are
taken to be primitive and to provide the basis of metaphysical inquiry. The rough idea is
that metaphysical disputes are about what is fundamental, or the world's structure, or
what is true not simpliciter, but in Reality. These notions pick out a special class of truths
and on these views simply grasping the truth is not enough in metaphysics; we must also
discern what is fundamental.51
My concern in this chapter is not the notions of structure or fundamentality
themselves but the question of their usefulness in defending metaphysics. Ultimately I
will argue that it is a mistake to base one's defense of metaphysics on such notions.
51 Although I will criticize these views, this reveals an important insight that they share. They all correctly
recognize that mere truth is not enough to satisfy us in the theoretical realm. We don't simply want a list of
everything that's true, but we seek to understand certain classes of truths that are distinguished from the
rest in some way (for instance, in physics we seek to understand general laws; a description of all physical
events with no unifying principles would be unsatisfying). Similarly, the form that a theory takes is also
very important; we could, for instance, have a theory consisting of a single sentence "F" stipulated to
express the proposition true in the actual world alone, but the theory would still be unsatisfying. When
theorizing, we generally don't just want truths of whatever kind in whatever form, but certain kinds of
truths in a perspicuous form. So, the general thrust of the views I will criticize is not misguided but, as I
will argue, the particular implementation (using notions of structure or fundamentality to isolate the
privileged class of truths) is.
Before that, however, it will help to get a bit clearer on the role they play in such
defenses.
3.1 Significance and Structure
There are various different things that might count as a defense of metaphysics
and various different aspects of metaphysics that one might defend. I will consider the
question of whether metaphysics is worth taking seriously: whether it is the kind of
inquiry that we should care about. My focus will be on particular metaphysical disputes
(rather than metaphysics as a whole), and my question will not be whether they are
genuine, or factual, but rather whether they matter or whether they are a waste of time.
These questions needn't be the same, for many genuine, factual questions are pointless
from the perspective of inquiry. For instance, we might, out of sheer fancy, wonder how
many blades of grass are on my property and even come to disagree about the correct
answer, but generally nothing of interest to anyone else will hang on the question.
So, the question I am interested in is whether metaphysical disputes are
worthwhile.5 2 My proposal is that a dispute is worthwhile if it is embedded in our inquiry
in the right sort of way: if it has consequences for other disputes or lines of research, if it
is the product of previous inquiry or tensions in our theorizing, and so on. Worthwhile
disputes are those with appropriate connections to the rest of our theorizing while
defective disputes are insular, with no clear implications for anything beyond themselves.
I call disputes of the first kind "significant" and those of the second "insignificant."53
Two virtues of this proposal are that it has very wide application and that it is
largely independent of one's metaphysical views (it does not, for instance, require one to
adopt any new metaphysical primitives). On the first point, the proposal is meant to
explain why any dispute whatsoever is worthwhile. It does not, in other words, apply
only to metaphysical disputes. So in applying this proposal to metaphysical disputes we
are holding metaphysics to a standard applicable to any area of inquiry. On the second
52 This is admittedly a rough characterization. I try to clarify it, and the proposal that follows, in chapters 1
and 2.
5 As in the previous chapters, I am using "significant" and "insignificant" as technical terms, signifying the
properties of disputes that make them worthwhile and not worthwhile respectively (which are, in my view,
the property of being connected to the rest of our inquiry in the right way and the property of being insular).
"Significant" can also carry connotations of being meaningful or genuine, but that is not my intention; the
intended reading is that significant disputes matter.
point, our standard of significance should be intelligible to people with a very wide range
of metaphysical and anti-metaphysical views. That should be the case on this proposal,
for the defense of a dispute's significance involves demonstrating its relevance for other
disputes outside itself; a defense of metaphysics, then, requires one to establish
connections between metaphysical questions and our other theoretical projects. This
standard of significance thus offers us a way of defending metaphysics that requires no
special treatment of metaphysics and should, in principle, be compelling even to those
not initially supportive of metaphysics.
In what follows, I will interpret the other defenses of metaphysics as addressing
the same question: "What makes metaphysical disputes worth taking seriously?" This is
not, as I will discuss in a moment, the only way to interpret them, but I think it is fair. I
will not assume at the outset that their views are incompatible with the one I have just
sketched. Rather, the question I am interested in is to what extent, if at all, their defenses
can help establish that metaphysical disputes are significant in the sense just sketched
and, if they can't, what sorts of problems that poses for them.
Of those defenses, the best developed is Theodore Sider's account in terms of
structure (see Sider (2001, 2009, and MSa). Here the idea is that the world has a
fundamental structure. The more structural some aspect of the world is, the more eligible
it is to supply the meaning (in many cases, referent) of some expression in our language.
The model here is David Lewis' theory of intentionality and the notion of natural
properties it involves (see Lewis (1983a and 1999)). 4
On Lewis' theory, there is a primitive distinction between the more and the less
natural properties, with the perfectly natural properties at one end of the spectrum.5 5
Since the distinction is primitive, no definition of naturalness is available, but some basic
features are notable: natural properties are non-disjunctive and non-gerrymandered, the
5 The theory of natural properties that Lewis and Sider accept has broad motivations and wide-ranging
applications, as is clear from the discussion in Lewis (1983a). I am focusing on its uses in their theories of
intentionality, but that shouldn't be thought of as the whole story. Similarly the idea of structure needn't be
assimilated to the natural property model, though it does provide a convenient framework for making sense
of the idea.
* It's possible to have a similar view where naturalness does not come in degrees. On that view,
something is either natural or not. This more absolute conception of naturalness may be more amenable to
Sider's views, since it better captures the idea of the world's fundamental structure. It's also hard to make
sense of degrees of naturalness when extending the notion of naturalness to cover logical vocabulary, as
below.
sharing of them makes for objective similarities, they help explain causal powers and
feature in laws of nature. Green, for instance, is more natural than grue, and positive
charge is more natural than both.
Naturalness also functions as a constraint on the interpretation of our language.
Meaning, on this view, can be thought of as the result of interpretation that satisfies
certain constraints. One constraint is supplied by some version of the principle of charity,
which requires that most of our utterances come out true or at least reasonable. The
principle can be thought of as requiring that the interpretation of our language respect our
usage of language. The other constraint, on Lewis's view, is eligibility: the more natural
some property or object (where the naturalness of objects is a function of the naturalness
of their properties), the more eligible it is to stand as the semantic value of some
expression. Thus the world itself plays a role in fixing the interpretation of our language,
with better interpretations assigning more natural objects and properties as referents.
Meaning is the outcome of applying these two constraints which often pull in opposite
directions.
Sider adopts this picture but generalizes it beyond properties and objects so that it
can be applied to all aspects of our language. Of particular importance is his extension of
this idea to logical vocabulary; in particular, to quantifiers and logical connectives. On
this view, some interpretations of the existential quantifier are better than others not
simply because they better match our usage, but rather because they are more natural.
They are metaphysically privileged; they mirror the world's existential structure.
Similarly with other non-referential expressions like the logical connectives "and" and
"or."Y
On this generalized picture, expressions can be more or less structural, depending
on how well they capture the world's structure or depending on whether they have more
or less eligible interpretations. Those that are highly structural can be said to "carve at
the joints," in a metaphor that Sider borrows from Plato. How does one tell whether
some expression is structural in this way? The primary indicator is its ideological
indispensability; a good indication that some expression is structural is that no fully
adequate theory of the world can be formulated without employing that expression. It is,
for instance, along these lines that Sider argues that the existential quantifier carves at the
joints (as in Sider (2009) and Sider (MSa, sec. 5.5 and 7.4.3)). It's not clear to what
extent this provides an independent criterion, since whether we think a theory is fully
adequate might itself depend on our views about structure, but it does provide some
constraints on whether to regard some expression as structural.
These notions play into the defense of metaphysics in the following way.
Disputes are substantive, or deep, to the extent that they are couched in terms that carve
at the joints. That is, each dispute can be understood as targeting some particular
sentences; if those sentences are structural-if they have a univocal interpretation that is
clearly best in terms of eligibility-then the dispute is deep or substantive. On the other
end of the spectrum are disputes whose sentences are open to a number of equally
eligible, equally charitable yet incompatible interpretations; those disputes are shallow
and perhaps merely verbal. In between are disputes where the sentences in question have
a univocal interpretation but are nonetheless not deep. It's harder to characterize this
class of disputes in Sider's terms, but one possibility is that although in these cases the
relevant sentences have a single best interpretation, that interpretation is fixed by the
principle of charity, or our usage of language, rather than eligibility, or the naturalness of
the interpretation. In these cases, the dispute is shallow but there is nonetheless a fact of
the matter about which view is correct. On Sider's view, many familiar metaphysical
disputes are deep (the expressions they target carve at the joints) and so should be taken
seriously.
Some aspects of Sider's picture-in particular the idea that the quantifier might
have multiple interpretations, with some more natural than others-are a bit obscure, so it
will help to consider an example. Time has long been an important topic in metaphysics
and one well-known dispute in contemporary metaphysics concerns the existence of past
and future objects. On one side, presentists argue that only objects that exist in the
present exist at all, while on the other side eternalists defend the idea that past and future
objects exist in addition to presently existing objects (they do not, of course, exist now or
in the present, but that does not mean they do no exist simpliciter). A common
deflationary reaction to this dispute is that both sides are right on some plausible
interpretation of their existential claims and so no genuine disagreement remains. When
the presentist uses "exist" they should be interpreted as saying something synonymous
with "exists now," as we would ordinarily use that expression. Their claim that only
presently existing things exist then comes out as obviously true; even the eternalist would
agree that only presently existing things exist now. Eternalists, on the other hand, should
be interpreted so that "exist" means the same in their mouths as "exists now or did exist
or will exist" does in ours. Again, even the presentist would agree that past, present and
future things all exist now or did exist or will exist (they insist that past and future things
do not exist, but grant that they did or will exist). Given these interpretations of their
existential claims, no real disagreement remains, since both positions become obvious
trivialities. Any real disagreement hinges on there being a tenseless, atemporal notion of
existence, one where it is an open question whether things that exist in that sense all exist
in the present or whether some of them exist at times in the past or future. So, there are at
least three interpretations of the quantifier in the vicinity: exists now, exists in the past or
present or future, and exists simpliciter (where the last notion is tenseless). Here is where
Sider's idea that some interpretations are more natural than others comes into play, for
one can argue that the last is more natural than the first two, containing no implicit tenses
and being less disjunctive. If so, then the dispute is best understood using that particular
interpretation and our initial deflationary reaction is seen to be mistaken.
Proponents of similar notions are less explicit about how their views work, but the
idea is similar. At least in metaphysics, disputes are worthwhile insofar as they concern
what is fundamental or what is true in Reality. Otherwise, they are a waste of time.
Compare Jonathan Schaffer on questions about what exists:
Contemporary metaphysics, under the Quinean regime, has focused on existence
questions such as whether properties, meanings and numbers exist.... [I] suggest
that the contemporary existence debates are trivial, in that the entities in question
obviously do exist. (What is not trivial is whether they are fundamental). (Schaffer
(2009, p. 356-7))
The deep questions about numbers, properties, and parts (inter alia) are not
whether there are such things, but how. (Schaffer (2009, p. 361-2)
Here it's clear that on Schaffer's view metaphysicians would do better by ignoring
trivialities concerning what exists. The real work of metaphysics is to figure out what is
fundamental.
On Kit Fine's (2009) view, the project of metaphysics is to describe what is
constitutive of Reality, where being constitutive of Reality goes beyond merely being
true. There is, in other words, some metaphysically absolute conception of Reality,
according to Fine, such that something can be true while failing to be true in Reality. In
explaining how to understand the traditional atomist view that the world is nothing but
atoms in the void, Fine puts the idea as follows:
[On the atomist's view] it will be constitutive of reality that this or that atom has
such and such a trajectory but no part of reality that there is a chair over there,
even though it is in fact true that there is a chair over there. (Fine (2009, p. 175))
As on Schaffer's view, questions of existence or what is true are not at the heart of
metaphysics. It may well be that there are chairs and numbers and various other things.
The important question, however, is whether such things are constitutive of Reality.
There are, however, important differences between their views and Sider's. For
Schaffer, the primitive notion is the relation of grounding, which is a unique kind of
metaphysical dependence (unique in the sense that it cannot be explained in terms of
other familiar dependence relations, like supervenience). Grounding in turn helps explain
what is fundamental, where the fundamental is what grounds but is not grounded by
anything else. This gives rise to a conception of metaphysics as a roughly Aristotelian
project of identifying substances (the fundamental entities) and explaining how they
ground the non-substances (the derivative entities). The crucial difference from Sider is
that Sider's notion of structure can attach to any expression in a language, while for
Schaffer the notion of grounding expresses a relation that holds between different
entities.
On Fine's view, the primitive notion is something's being the case in Reality,
where the expression "in Reality" is understood as a sentential operator which marks that
the sentence in question is true in a metaphysically strict sense (see, for instance, Fine
(2009, p. 171-4)). Again this differs from Sider, because for Sider the "structure"
operator (if we understand his project along those lines) can operate on any linguistic
expression (including, for instance, names, predicates, quantifiers, connectives, etc.)
These differences result in different conceptions of metaphysics and of what
counts as a worthwhile metaphysical question. To simplify things in what follows, I will
focus primarily on the picture developed by Sider. I will call disputes that are
substantive or deep on this picture "structural;" thus a dispute counts as structural if the
sentences it targets are themselves structural. My focus will be on the question of
whether structural disputes are worth taking seriously, and vice versa, a question I think
these philosophers would answer in the affirmative. I am, to some extent, putting words
in their mouths in saying this. Sider, for instance, is mostly concerned with showing that
metaphysical disagreements are deep or substantive rather than merely verbal or shallow
in some other way. I don't, however, think it's a stretch to attribute this claim to them.
For it is clear that the main proponents of notions like fundamentality, structure,
naturalness, and so on, think that structural disputes are worth taking seriously.
Generally, these notions are appealed to in defense of certain disputes that others think
are misguided or defective. This strategy would be a poor defense if it demonstrated only
that disputes are structural but left it unsettled whether people should bother to pursue
them seriously. Consider, for instance, what Sider says in defense of his notion of
metaphysical structure:
The goal of inquiry is not merely to believe many true propositions and few false
ones. It is to discern the structure of the world. An ideal inquirer must think of
the world in terms of its distinguished structure; she must carve the world at its
joints in her thinking and language. Employers of worse languages are worse
inquirers. (Sider (2009, p. 401))
It's clear that on this picture, structural disputes should matter to ideal inquirers.
56 I do think my criticisms can be adapted to Schaffer's and Fine's views as well, but it is not immediately
straightforward how to do so.
57 There may be another natural interpretation of what it is for a dispute to be structural: it is for a dispute to
be about structure or to concern what is structural. That is not what I have in mind in what follows.
In what follows I will also assume that I am at least partially correct about the
connection between a dispute's being worthwhile and its being significant. What I will
assume is that disputes can't be worthwhile without being significant (or connected to the
rest of our inquiry in the way described above) and vice versa. The question is whether
there is any similar connection between being worthwhile (hence significant) and being
structural. My assumption is not meant to build-in any particular answer to this question
from the outset; it could well be that significant disputes are also structural, and vice
versa. The question I will explore is whether that is so. If not, I think this presents a
serious problem for these defenses of metaphysics.
Why is it a problem? Some ways of defending metaphysics are dialectically
stronger than others. Some have a better chance of convincing someone who is initially
skeptical of metaphysics or who is undecided about whether to take metaphysics
seriously. Who will find which arguments plausible is not the sort of question that I want
to speculate about, but it's plausible that the more metaphysical assumptions one makes
in one's defense, the less convincing that defense will be. On this score, simply arguing
that certain disputes concern the world's structure, or concern what is metaphysically
fundamental, is a poor defense. Someone initially skeptical will find this little reason to
care about such disputes, assuming they are even willing to countenance the required
notions of structure or fundamentality at all. A more compelling defense would show
that such disputes can't simply be ignored because they are relevant to other questions
that even someone outside of metaphysics could be interested in. For that reason, a lack
of connection between structure and significance would leave the defense in terms of
structure in a weak dialectical position. It could still be true that metaphysics concerns
what is structural, but that will give us little reason to take it seriously. Thus the problem
I will present is not so much an internal criticism of Sider's framework, pointing out
some tension or contradiction in his view; he might, for instance, be happy to grant that
on his view metaphysics does not meet the standard of significance that I set out. The
complaint, rather, is that his view leaves us with an inaccurate and dialectically crippled
conception of metaphysics, one that I think strengthens rather than weakens many of the
common negative reactions people have towards it.
The question, then, is whether the following two claims are true:
Necessity: If a dispute is significant, it is structural.
Sufficiency: If a dispute is structural, it is significant.
I will argue that both are false.
3.2 Necessity
Must all significant disputes be structural? I think not. This should not come as a
big surprise to proponents of Sider's view; indeed, as I will say in a moment, I think
Sider concedes that Necessity is false and so the falsity of Necessity alone is not a fatal
problem for Sider's view. Yet I do think its falsity is important. Seeing how it is false
helps us understand the difference between structurality and significance. More
importantly, its falsity figures into a larger problem with Sider's view, a problem
concerning the conception of metaphysics we are left with once all the ties between
structure and significance are severed.
Why think Necessity is false? Consider an example. For several decades,
disputes about the nature of modality have been at the forefront of metaphysics. They
concern questions like: are possible worlds concrete or abstract? Are there merely
possible things or are all possible things actual? What is the extent of metaphysical
possibility and how does it differ from physical possibility and conceptual possibility?
The work on these and similar questions has been highly influential not just
within metaphysics, but throughout philosophy and, more indirectly, outside philosophy
as well. Without going into too much detail, these disputes have had an impact on the
philosophy of language (e.g. in arguments Kripke (1980) offers for his theory of names),
philosophy of mind (e.g. in the many modal arguments offered for dualism, like those in
David Chalmers (1996)), epistemology (e.g. in counterfactual theories of knowledge),
and in the philosophy of science (e.g. in disputes over the nature of physical laws and
causation).58
58 For more detailed discussion of some different connections between modal metaphysics and other issues
see chapter 2.
Outside philosophy the importance of these disputes derives from their influence
on the development of modal logic. Much of the groundbreaking work in modal logic
throughout the last century was entangled with these metaphysical issues. Difficult
questions about how to interpret modal operators, especially when iterated, gained new
clarity when viewed in terms of possible worlds, an idea derived from the metaphysical
views of Leibniz. Disagreements, including those between W. V. 0. Quine (1976c) and
Kripke (1980), over the coherence of Aristotelian essentialism fed into disagreements
over the coherence of modal logic. Questions about the ideas of transworld identity and
de re modality led to the development of various formal frameworks for handling them,
including the counterpart semantics developed by Lewis (1968 and 1986). Similar
connections appear in work on other modal notions, like counterfactuals and causation.
It's clear that much of the formal work on modal logics and the semantics of
modal terms was motivated and influenced by metaphysical concerns. 59 Modal logic,
however, has a life outside metaphysics as well. It has important applications outside of
philosophy altogether, in computer science and mathematics. 60  Although computer
scientists are not typically concerned with metaphysical questions about the nature and
extent of necessity, the ontological status of possible worlds, and the coherence of de re
modality, they employ formal tools whose development was closely tied to those
metaphysical questions. Their work is not metaphysical, but metaphysics has, at least
indirectly, had some impact on their work.
These disputes over modal metaphysics are, to my mind, among the least
controversial examples of significant metaphysical disputes. Nonetheless, they need not
be regarded as structural as a result. Sider, in particular, argues that they are not: "At
59 One might complain that this is merely a contingent historical accident. Modal logics may have been
developed solely by ethicists concerned with the logic of "ought" or by epistemologists looking for a way
to formalize relations between "believes" and "knows." I agree, and in actual fact such concerns did play
an important role in the development of modal logic. But metaphysics also played an important role and I
don't think that is in any way reduced by the fact that things could have been otherwise. The question is
not whether disputes over metaphysical questions are essentially connected to formal questions in modal
logic; the question is whether those disputes were relevant to those formal questions, and I think it's clear
that they were.
60 For instance, in computer science, modal logics have been used to help understand distributed systems (a
simple model might treat each computer as a possible world and relations of accessibility as network
connections between them, allowing theorists to model how information is shared in the system), alongside
other, more general applications in modeling computer operations, the evolution of databases over time,
error-handling, and so on. In mathematics more generally, modal logic has been useful in clarifying the
concept of provability (as in George Boolos (1993)).
bottom, the world is an amodal place. Necessity and possibility do not carve at the joints;
fundamentally, there is no modality." (MSa, p. 199) Of course, he still admits that there
are modal truths, but they are not properly the concern of metaphysics. The only
interesting metaphysical question concerning modality is how to get rid of it: how to
reduce it or to account for it in terms of what is fundamental. He goes on to offer a view
on which modality is largely a matter of convention.
Why think modality does not carve at the joints? The motivation is to minimize
the required stock of primitive notions we should employ in our theories. Metaphysicians
should seek to characterize the world as it is fundamentally using the most economical
ideology possible and modal notions do not make the cut. Admitting them would
needlessly bloat our fundamental language, where a fundamental language includes all
and only those expressions that carve at the joints. One might think this begs the
question, for one must already think modality is not part of the world's structure in order
to think that modal notions aren't needed to describe that structure. The point, however,
might simply be that we should try to get by with as little as possible and modality is a
better candidate for reduction than existence, say, or various properties mentioned in
physics. Elsewhere Sider offers a further reason for excluding modality: "one's primitive
ideology should be categorical, not hypothetical." (Sider, MSb) Whether that reason
stands up to scrutiny (are modal notions hypothetical? What does that mean and why is
this restriction plausible in the first place?) is not my concern here. The important
observation is that on the austere conception of structure that Sider prefers, modality is
nowhere to be found. Thus disputes over whether something is necessary are not
structural, since the key terms they target (like "necessary") do not carve at the joints.
Nonetheless, he agrees that disputes over modality have wide-ranging relevance.
Their target notions, like necessity, are "horizontally rich," in his terms, even though they
are not "vertically deep" (or structural) (Sider (MSa, p. 56-7)). In other words, they are
"central to our conceptual scheme." (Sider (MSa, p. 201)) In this way they are similar to
other issues in metaphysics, like causation and personal identity. 61 All of these are cases
61 See, for instance, Mark Johnston (1992), where Johnston argues that even if personal identity cannot be
reduced to, and doesn't supervene on, the fundamental physical properties and relations of the sort Derek
Parfit (1984) takes to be the only plausible candidates, it doesn't follow that we shouldn't care about
personal identity or that it isn't the relation that really matters to us.
where the relevant disputes target some notion that is commonly employed not just in
metaphysics but throughout our lives and they have an impact on many issues beyond
themselves. 62 Yet they also concern some notion which should not, on Sider's view, be
included in the austere characterization of the world's structure.
So Sider should agree that the disputes about modality I mentioned at the outset
are significant, in my sense, but not deep or structural. We differ, I think, in what
conclusions we draw from this. For Sider, I take it, this result means that modality
should not be a primary concern of metaphysicians. Some questions remain (for
instance, what is the best way to reduce modality or to understand modal notions in terms
of others that do carve at the joints?), but it is a mistake to think that modality is a central
metaphysical notion and metaphysicians who engage in the sorts of disputes I mentioned
initially are focusing on the wrong sorts of questions. The real action lies elsewhere.
From my perspective, this reaction is a grave mistake. Discovering that a
metaphysical dispute bears on other questions, that it is entangled with issues from other
disciplines, provides a powerful reason to take it seriously as an important theoretical
issue, one that could convince someone who is not antecedently friendly to metaphysics.
For this reason, my reaction is the opposite of Sider's: modality is a prime example of a
metaphysical notion the study of which produced important results not just for
metaphysics, but for our inquiries in general. It is, therefore, one which deserves the least
suspicion.
This example illustrates how a dispute's significance does not require that it be
structural. The reason is that the disputes with the widest relevance are not necessarily
those that concern the most structural notions, which is no real surprise given how much
of human inquiry concerns phenomena that go beyond what is purely fundamental.
Sider, I think, would grant this, but that does not mean it is entirely unproblematic for his
view. An initial concern is that using Sider's view as a guide to which disputes to take
seriously might result in a misallocation of intellectual resources, since it would
recommend that we ignore certain disputes that are highly significant (as in the case of
62 I do not mean to suggest that the mere fact that some dispute targets a horizontally rich notion is enough
to guarantee its significance (see sections 3.3 and 3.4 for why I think it is not enough). Some disputes
about necessity, for instance, might well be insignificant. In the cases I've been discussing, however, we
have good reason to think that the disputes do have important connections.
modality). A plausible response to this worry is that Sider's view offers a
recommendation for what metaphysicians should work on, and if these issues are truly
important, they can be taken up by those outside of metaphysics (after all, why does it
matter if we think of them as part of metaphysics or not?). But here a greater worry
begins to emerge, for we have taken the first step towards severing any link between
structure and significance, leaving us with a view of metaphysics as cut off from the rest
of our inquiry, rendered irrelevant and uninteresting to everyone but metaphysicians
themselves. We might then question whether metaphysics-of whatever sort we're left
with-is really worth defending.
The problem, however, would be mitigated if being structural were sufficient for
being significant. Although metaphysicians would, in that case, miss out on some
significant disputes, metaphysics as a whole could not be accused of being insular and
irrelevant.
3.3 Sufficiency
Must structural disputes be significant? Again, I think the answer is no. Consider
the following example. At one point, Sider asks: "What is the list of (perfectly) joint-
carving propositional connectives? Is it: A and ~? Or is it V and ~? Or perhaps the only
joint-carving connective is the Sheffer stroke |?" (Sider, (MSa, sec. 8.2)) Now imagine a
dispute over which connectives to use in formalizing one's theory, with one side arguing
that the theory should only include disjunction and negation while the other argues it
should only include conjunction and negation. Such a dispute ought to count as
structural. Its key vocabulary carves at the joints and the theory may end up a better
reflection of the world's structure depending on how the dispute plays out. We can also
grant that there really is a fact of the matter about which connectives we ought to use. 63
Even granting all this, it's hard to see how it is significant, precisely because the
connectives are interdefinable in a quite straightforward way.64 Choosing one set of
63 It can be difficult to make sense of this suggestion, but we could imagine that there is some primitive fact
about what the correct selection of connectives is, or we might tell a story which privileges one group over
the other (perhaps in creating reality, God created conjunction and negation, leaving disjunction to emerge
from those as an after-thought).
64 I emphasize the fact that it is straightforward because I think accusations that disputes are insignificant
because the involved claims are interdefinable are more problematic than they can seem, because it can be
connectives over the other is unlikely to have any ramifications for issues beyond the
dispute itself.65
We can find similar counterexamples by picking up on the idea that disputes
couched in terms of logical vocabulary tend to be structural on Sider's view. Consider,
for instance, a dispute over whether to always use the existential quantifier as opposed to
the universal quantifier. Or, a somewhat different case, consider a dispute over how
many things there are; as Sider mentions (2009, p. 390) claims about how many things
there are (such as "there are at least n things") can be stated using purely logical
vocabulary and so the disputes in question are structural. Yet it's hard to see what, if
anything, would hang on them.66
These examples, however, are a bit artificial, since these aren't the kind of
disputes people are interested in when raising questions about the status of metaphysics.
(Although that itself might be a problem for Sider: if the best that can be said for
metaphysical disputes is that they are analogous to disputes like these, then one might
wonder if any real progress has been made towards showing that metaphysics is a
worthwhile form of inquiry.) In fact, this strategy of argument-offering specific
counterexamples to claims like Sufficiency-is in some ways unsatisfactory. For Sider
could grant the falsity of Sufficiency in the strict form I've presented, favoring instead a
generic reading of the claim. In other words, the important point for Sider is that
structural disputes tend to be significant and, when this is so, it is precisely because they
are structural. So he might well grant that the move from structure to significance is not
without exceptions while insisting that being structural tends to make disputes significant.
difficult to find a suitably neutral sense of interdefinability. (see chapter 2, sec. 2.2.1) Those criticisms do
not apply in this case, I don't think, for we are dealing with a formal language with clearly stipulated
meanings for the connectives.
65 This example highlights a way in which Sider's view is distinctive, compared to more traditional
metaphysical views, for although notions of structure or fundamentality are similar to more traditional
notions of substance and dependence, those traditional notions usually involve some kind of explanatory
asymmetry which is lacking in this case. For Sider, two notions can be completely interdefinable, with no
explanatory asymmetry between then, and yet one can still be more fundamental than the other.
66 Of course it's not inconceivable that how many things there are might matter for some question in
mathematics, say, or physics or metaphysics, but on the face of it, without filling in the story, it's hard to
see what that question would be. Nonetheless, some philosophers have held that it does matter, especially
finitists in the philosophy of mathematics (of which F. P. Ramsey and the later Wittgenstein may have been
examples). The important point for me is that, as I will argue in a moment, the mere fact that how many
things there are can be stated in structural terms isn't enough to show that anything hangs on the issue.
So, let's investigate whether a dispute's being structural gives us a reason to think
that it is significant and let's consider a more realistic example in the process. There are
some metaphysical disputes that should count as structural on Sider's view, but where it's
doubtful that we should regard them as significant for that reason alone. One example is
the dispute over composition: imagine a disagreement over whether there are any
composite objects (e.g. tables as opposed to particles-arranged-tablewise) at all. Sider
notes that
some of the most metaphysically fundamental disputes are horizontally poor-
they have relatively few implications outside rarified metaphysics. Think, for
example, of disputes over the ontology of composite material objects. This, I
suspect, feeds much of the common distrust of those disputes. (Sider, (MSa, p.
57))
In my terms, Sider seems to be admitting that the composition dispute is not significant,
even though it is structural. I do not, however, want to assume that this dispute is
insignificant. Demonstrating that would require careful consideration of the dispute itself
which goes beyond my concerns here. Instead, let's assume that the dispute is in fact
structural. The important question is whether granting that assumption is enough to
establish that it is also significant. It is that connection that I want to question.
What can we infer from the assumption that the composition dispute is structural?
The characteristic feature of such disputes is that the expressions they target carve at the
joints. In the case of composition, the relevant bits of language include the idioms of
quantification (especially the existential quantifier and the identity symbol) and
mereology (including expressions like "is a part of'). What can we infer from the
assumption that such terms carve at the joints? We can conclude that they, in some
sense, capture the world's metaphysical structure and that no fully adequate theory of the
world could fail to include them. But that is not enough to show that any dispute which
targets those terms is significant. For what we need is some reason to think that the
dispute itself has connections to issues beyond itself, and the fact that the terms employed
are joint carving and indispensable supplies no such reason. This is illustrated by our
initial counterexamples: the fact that terms are joint carving doesn't prevent one from
formulating insignificant disputes by using them. We can take theoretically
indispensable terms and then have pointless disputes involving them. If that were not the
case, then any dispute over what exists, phrased in joint-carving terms, would be
significant, no matter how foolish (as in questions like "Does conjunction exist?" or "Is
there conjunction?" which are hard to make sense of).
At best, the fact that the terms used in some disagreement are joint carving shows
that a different but related dispute might be significant. Consider the question of whether
the dispute over composition is structural. A disagreement over that question might well
be significant, for it bears on issues concerning the correct ideology to employ in
formulating our theories. There are connections, in other words, between it and our
theorizing in general. But that does not show that the composition dispute itself is
significant, even if it is structural. In other words, a dispute over whether the
composition dispute is structural could well be significant even if the composition dispute
is not (even if we assume that it is in fact structural).
The general problem here is that a dispute's being structural is only enough to
establish a connection between the vocabulary employed in that dispute and our
theorizing in general. It does not establish any connection between the disputed positions
and our theorizing in general. Even if the vocabulary carves at the joints, it could still
make no difference which particular view expressed in that vocabulary ends up being
true. Both views will employ the same terms, so even if it's a significant question
whether to employ those terms, the question of which of those views is true need not be
significant.
I am not arguing that structural disputes are insignificant. Returning to our
example, I remain neutral, at this point, about whether the dispute over composition is
significant or not. Rather, I'm arguing that a dispute's being structural is not, by itself,
enough to show that it is significant. I think there are clear examples that demonstrate
this and we can explain why it would be so in terms of Sider's overall view.
These observations provide compelling reason for rejecting Sufficiency in both its
strict and its more generic forms. The strict reading is open to counterexamples that can
be constructed using the observation that nothing prevents us from formulating pointless
disputes using joint-carving language. The more generic reading, according to which
being structural tends to explain why certain disputes are significant, is called into doubt
because it's not at all clear how such explanations would proceed. As we've seen,
assuming that a dispute is in fact structural doesn't seem to provide any reason, on its
own, to think that it is significant. Even if we assume that the dispute over composition
is both structural and significant, its being structural would not explain why it is
significant nor even provide much guidance to whether it is or not. Thus even if it were
true that, in general, structural disputes are significant, it needn't be that they are
significant because they are structural. On its own, being structural is not sufficient for
being significant, cannot explain why a dispute is significant, and is not a reliable
indication that a dispute is significant (except, perhaps, purely by accident).
If appealing to structure is meant to provide a reason for those suspicious of
metaphysics to take it more seriously, then our conclusion presents a serious problem for
the view. For simply arguing that a dispute is structural is not enough to show that it
matters for anything beyond itself. Given the falsity of Necessity and Sufficiency,
Sider's view feeds directly into the suspicion that metaphysical disputes are irrelevant to
the rest of philosophy and science and can be safely ignored. They might well be "deep"
or "fundamental," but few find that a compelling reason, on its own, to take them
seriously. We are left with a picture of metaphysics on which it is an insular and
irrelevant form of inquiry and the appeal to structure does little, dialectically, to reassure
those who doubt its significance. A defense of metaphysics which leads to such a
conception of the discipline is, I think, both inaccurate and undesirable.
3.4 An Alternative Picture
I have argued that the picture of metaphysics as the study of the world's
fundamental structure is an unfortunate one. It does, however, possess the advantage of
giving us some grasp of what metaphysics is and where it belongs in our inquiry more
generally. If we reject that picture, is there another that could take its place?
Sider defends the idea that the key notions that metaphysics investigates all carve
at the joints; they are, in his terms, vertically deep. I think a better picture of metaphysics
is available if we switch axes: the targets of metaphysical investigation are all
horizontally rich to a very high degree, meaning their usage throughout the rest of our
inquiry and theoretical activities is near ubiquitous. Consider, for instance, the primary
targets of metaphysical investigation: existence, necessity, properties, numbers, parthood,
identity, personhood, time, causation, and so on. They find employment in almost every
theoretical activity. Not so for the objects of most other disciplines; bosons, for instance,
play little role in economics, while emerging markets don't often figure in physics.
That's not to say that these other disciplines take existence or properties, for instance, as
objects of study, but they rely on notions of existence or properties in the course of
performing their investigations. The characteristic feature of metaphysics is that it
reverses this trend. It takes as its objects those notions that find application throughout
the rest of our inquiry.
This feature is not, of course, unique to metaphysics, nor is it universally true of
all metaphysics. It does not give us a perfect way of demarcating metaphysics from other
areas of investigation. Yet I don't think this should trouble us, for I don't think
metaphysics is clearly demarcated from other areas of investigation and it is precisely
those areas which also share the feature I'm describing with metaphysics that share the
fuzziest boundaries with it. I have in mind other areas of philosophy like epistemology
and logic, both of which also target notions with widespread application but which also
shade into metaphysics in many cases. So, this characterization is a bit fuzzy, but it
nonetheless gives us a useful characterization of what metaphysics is and where it
belongs in our inquiry.
It also helps explain a number of common reactions people have to metaphysics,
without necessarily vindicating them. For instance, it helps explain the traditional,
though currently unpopular, view that metaphysics is first philosophy. A natural thought
is that if metaphysics studies things presupposed by every other area of inquiry, without
presupposing much from those other areas itself, then clearly our theoretical projects
ought to begin with metaphysics. Our picture of metaphysics can explain why this
thought sometimes strikes people as plausible, but we need not agree with it for reasons I
will discuss in a moment.
It also helps explain various negative reactions to metaphysics, like the thought
that metaphysics is transcendental (in some objectionable sense), or that it lacks content,
or is focused on external questions rather than internal ones, as in Rudolf Carnap (1956).
The complaint is that metaphysics takes the conceptual apparatus we employ throughout
the rest of our inquiry and tries to turn it into an object of study on its own. It treats the
tools of inquiry as objects of study. This naturally gives rise to the thought that
something has gone wrong in metaphysics: that it lacks content or rests on some kind of
conceptual use/mention confusion. The plausibility of this thought can be explained by
our picture, for it's true that the objects of metaphysics are generally the notions relied on
throughout the rest of inquiry and which can thus come to seem like a kind of
presupposed conceptual background rather than a potential object of study.
The mistake in both these reactions is in assuming some link between the idea that
the targets of metaphysics are very horizontally rich and the issue of whether
metaphysical questions (or the disputes over their correct answers) are significant. The
first assumes that they must be highly significant, if they target these ubiquitous notions,
while the second assumes the opposite. I think the truth lies somewhere in the middle,
for I think the mere fact that the key terms of metaphysics are horizontally rich cannot, by
itself, settle the question of whether metaphysical disputes are significant. This helps
explain a third, less partisan reaction to metaphysics, which is that even if metaphysical
disputes turn out to be worthwhile, metaphysics, at the outset, stands more in need of
defense than most other areas of inquiry. There is, in other words, a stronger
presumption of guilt when it comes to metaphysics compared to most other disciplines.
That feeling stems from the implicit recognition that the constraints on metaphysical
questions are very thin and by themselves do not suffice to show that the questions matter
much for anything else. The terms "number" and "existence" have extremely widespread
application, but that alone does not show that disputes over the question "Do numbers
exist?" are fruitful. At this level of abstraction, it's totally unclear whether anything
hangs on it.
The reasoning here is much the same as that towards the end of section 3.3. There
I argued that the mere fact that some term carves at the joints does not show that disputes
formulated using it are significant, since it is possible to express silly positions in joint-
carving terms. The nature of the vocabulary alone is not enough to give the positions that
employ it, and the disagreements between them, any purchase. The same is true,
however, in the case of horizontal rather than vertical depth. The fact that some terms are
widely employed doesn't show that every question we might ask about them leads to
fruitful theorizing and it doesn't show the opposite either, that questions we might ask
about them are somehow defective or pointless. It shows that we must, in each case,
consider carefully whether anything is really at stake. In some cases, once we fill in the
story we will find that there are rival conceptions of these commonly used notions which
would lead to widespread differences throughout the rest of our inquiry. In those cases,
we have a significant metaphysical disagreement.
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